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ABSTRACT
Ransomware attacks are becoming increasingly pervasive and
disruptive, resulting in ransom demands becoming more exorbitant.
Payments for ransom costs are increasingly being covered by insurance,
which may offer coverage for a variety of cyber-related losses. Some
commentators have expressed concern over this market phenomenon.
Specifically, the concern is that the presence of insurance is making the
ransomware problem worse based on the following theory: because there is
ransomware insurance that covers ransom payments, and because paying
the ransom is often far cheaper than paying the restoration and business
interruption costs covered under the policy, there is an increased tendency
to pay the ransom—and a willingness to pay higher amounts. This fact,
known by the criminals, increases their incentive to engage in ransomware
attacks, which increases the demand for insurance. And the cycle continues.
This Article demonstrates that the picture is not as simple as this
story would suggest. Insurance offers a variety of pre-breach and postbreach services that are aimed at reducing the likelihood and severity of a
ransomware attack. Thus, over the long-term, cyber insurance has the
potential to lower ransomware-related costs, even without government
intervention. As recent research has shown, however, insurers have not yet
fully embraced their potential role as ex ante and ex post regulators of cyber
risk—a role for which they are especially well-suited. This Article discusses
reasons why that might be the case and offers suggestions for how
government intervention may help. Among these suggestions is a limited ban
on indemnity for ransomware payments with exceptions for cases involving
threats to life and limb, which would be an expanded version of what is
already in place with the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (“OFAC”)
sanctions program. We also explain how a government regulator, such as
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the OFAC, could serve a coordinating function to help cyber insurers
internalize the externalities associated with the insurers’ decisions to
reimburse ransomware payments—a role that is played by reinsurers in the
context of kidnap-and-ransom insurance. Finally, we consider the idea of a
federal mandate requiring property and casualty insurers to provide
coverage for the costs of ransomware attacks but exclude coverage for the
ransomware payments.
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INTRODUCTION
Ransomware attacks are increasingly pervasive and disruptive. Not
only are they shutting down (or at least “holding up”) businesses and local
governments across the country, they are disrupting institutions in many
sectors of the U.S. economy—from school systems, to medical facilities, to
critical elements of the U.S. energy infrastructure, as well as the food supply
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chain.1 In one recent example that grabbed the world’s attention, a
ransomware attack halted fuel distribution at Colonial Pipeline, which
supplies roughly forty-five percent of the diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel used
on the East Coast.2 Ransomware attacks are also growing more frequent and
the ransom demands more exorbitant.3 Indeed, the attacks are getting more
pernicious with every passing month.4 What’s more, as Commerce Secretary
Gina Raimondo has noted, ransomware attacks “are here to stay.”5

1

Heather Kelly, Ransomware Attacks Are Closing Schools, Delaying
Chemotherapy and Derailing Everyday Life, WASH. POST (June 5, 2021, 8:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/07/08/ransomware-humanimpact/ (describing increasing prevalence and seriousness of ransomware attacks).
Among the recent targets have been the Baltimore school system, a meat processing
company, and the ferry system at Martha’s Vineyard. Id.
2
See id.; Lily Hay Newman, Colonial Pipeline Paid a $5M Ransom—And Kept
a Vicious Cycle Turning, WIRED (May 14, 2021, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/colonial-pipeline-ransomware-payment/; David E.
Sanger, Clifford Krauss & Nicole Perlroth, Cyberattack Forces a Shutdown of a Top
U.S. Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/08/
us/politics/cyberattack-colonial-pipeline.html. According to the Congressional
testimony of Colonial’s CEO, the hackers were able to exploit Colonial Pipeline’s
failure to use dual authentication technology in its network. See Stephanie Kelly &
Jessica Resnick-Ault, Hackers Only Needed a Single Password to Disrupt Colonial
Pipeline, CEO Testifies, INS. J. (June 9, 2021), https://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/national/2021/06/09/617870.htm. The Colonial Pipeline attack prompted one
U.S. Congressman to call ransomware “an existential threat” to the country’s energy
system. Celine Castronuovo, Ron Johnson Calls Cyber Attacks an ‘Existential’
Threat Following Colonial Pipeline Shutdown, THE HILL (May 16, 2021, 7:00 AM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talk-shows/553725-ron-johnson-calls-cyberattacks-an-existential-threat-following?rl=1.
3
Suzanne Barlyn, Global Insurers Face Quiet Strain from Hacker Ransom
Demands, REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2019, 7:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-ransomware-insurance/global-insurers-face-quiet-strain-from-hacker-ransomdemands-idUSKBN1X41E3. See infra Part II.
4
See Ransomware Attack Vectors Shift As New Software Vulnerability Exploits
Abound, COVEWARE (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.coveware.com/blog/
ransomware-attack-vectors-shift-as-new-software-vulnerability-exploits-abound
(noting the increase in ransom payments by quarter).
5
David Cohen, Ransomware Attacks ‘Are Here to Stay,’ Commerce Secretary
Says, POLITICO (June 6, 2021, 10:28 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/
06/ransomware-attacks-commerce-secretary-492005.
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For those who have not been following this alarming development,
ransomware is a type of malicious software (“malware”) that suspends a
computer system’s backup functions, encrypts the user’s files, and demands
a ransom payment in exchange for the unlock key.6 Much like other
computer viruses, ransomware can enter a user’s system through several
paths, including user error (e.g., when an employee clicks a malicious link
received in an email message) or vulnerabilities in the network itself.7 Once
a computer or network is infected, the user is faced with choosing either to
rebuild the system or pay the ransom.8 Due to the high cost of rebuilding
computer networks, organizations that have fallen victim to ransomware
attacks (including hospitals, schools, businesses, and municipalities) have
become more inclined to simply pay the ransom.9
In a trend that some find disturbing, ransom payments are
increasingly being covered by insurance.10 Just as it is possible to buy
insurance coverage against the risk of being kidnapped for ransom,11 it is
6

Ransomware, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: SCAMS & SAFETY,
https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-scams-and-crimes/ransomware
(last visited Mar. 31, 2022).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Newman, supra note 2 (“[I]n practice many organizations resort to paying.
They either don’t have the backups and other infrastructure necessary to recover
otherwise, can’t or don’t want to take the time to recover on their own, or decide that
it’s cheaper to just quietly pay the ransom and move on.”). Colonial Pipeline, for
example, paid DarkSide, the Russian criminal cyber cartel responsible for most
recent attack, a seventy-five bitcoins ransom worth approximately $5 million at the
time. Id. The Department of Justice subsequently recovered sixty-four of those
bitcoins, worth roughly $2.3 million. MacKenzie Sigalos, The FBI Likely Exploited
Sloppy Password Storage to Seize Colonial Pipeline Bitcoin Ransom, CNBC (June
9, 2021, 7:09 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/08/fbi-likely-exploited-sloppypassword-storage-to-seize-colonial-ransom.html. Ironically, the DOJ apparently
was able to exploit the hackers’ sloppy use of passwords in securing their bitcoin
wallet. Id.
10
See Renee Dudley, The Extortion Economy: How Insurance Companies Are
Fueling a Rise in Ransomware Attacks, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 27, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-extortion-economy-how-insurancecompanies-are-fueling-a-rise-in-ransomware-attacks. As of the time this Article, it
remains unclear whether Colonial Pipeline relied on an insurer or simply paid the
ransom out of its own coffers.
11
See generally ANJA SHORTLAND, KIDNAP: INSIDE THE RANSOM BUSINESS
(2019).
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also possible to buy insurance against the risk of a ransomware attack. As a
result of the growing number of cyber threats and the insurance market’s
response to increasing demand for coverage, the market for specialized cyber
insurance policies has expanded dramatically in recent years.12 Such policies
offer coverage for a variety of cyber-related losses, including many of the
costs arising out of ransomware attacks, such as the costs of hiring expert
negotiators, the costs of recovering data from backups, the legal liabilities
for exposing sensitive customer information, and the ransom payments
themselves.13 Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, parties with ransomware
insurance are increasingly relying on their insurance carrier to negotiate
ransom demands and indemnify the payments.14
Some commentators have expressed concern with this market
phenomenon. Specifically, there is concern that the presence of insurance is
making the ransomware problem worse.15 Arguably, the most extreme
See Dudley, supra note 10 (“In recent years, cyber insurance sold by domestic
and foreign companies has grown into an estimated $7 billion to $8 billion-a-year
market in the U.S. alone . . . .”). See also infra Part III (describing the structures of
a cyber insurance policy and its ransomware coverage).
13
See, e.g., Barlyn, supra note 3 (discussing nature of trends in ransomware
attacks and nature of coverage). A number of insurers now provide coverage for
many of the costs of ransomware attacks in their standalone cyber insurance policies.
See, e.g., AIG INC., CYBEREDGE WORDING SAMPLE SPECIMEN FORM (2021), https://
perma.cc/T3VD-JR8R; X.L. AM., INC., CYBERRISKCONNECT: PRIVACY, SECURITY
AND TECHNOLOGY INSURANCE (2019), https://axaxl.com/-/media/axaxl/files/
pdfs/insurance/cyber-north-america/cyberriskconnectpolicyform_axaxl_trd-0500619.pdf?sc_lang=en&hash=8E1AC2226AA2330E5A9276F3A49E332F. Some
insurers also provide somewhat overlapping coverage in their kidnap & ransom
policies. See, e.g., AM. INT’L GRP., INC., CYBER COVER GUIDE (2018),
https://www.aig.com/content/dam/aig/america-canada/us/documents/business/
cyber/cyber-cover-grid.pdf [hereinafter AIG CYBER COVER GUIDE].
14
See Dudley, supra note 10.
15
See Alex Scroxton, Is It Time to Ban Ransomware Insurance Payments?,
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.computerweekly.com/
feature/Is-it-time-to-ban-ransomware-insurance-payments (quoting Erin Kenneally,
director of cyber risk analytics at Guidewire and former staffer in the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security’s cyber division, saying “insurers have taken a
rational economics approach to ransomware payments, leading to a growing
sentiment that the industry is worsening the problem by paying extortions.”); Zoe
Kleinman, Insurers Defend Covering Ransomware Payments, BBC: NEWS (Jan. 27,
2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-55811165;
Danny
Palmer,
12
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version of this claim appeared in an August 2019 ProPublica story that
linked the rise of ransomware attacks with the presence of cyber insurance.16
Noting several examples of insurance companies paying ransom demands to
unlock their insured’s systems, the ProPublica author suggests that the
insurance industry has contributed to a vicious cycle that fuels ransomware
attacks while padding insurers’ bottom lines.17 And the author gave this
collection of phenomena the evocative label, “the extortion economy.”18 The
logic behind this label goes something like the following: once an insurer
has sold a cyber insurance policy to an insured (e.g., a city or a corporation),
that insurer has a strong incentive to pay any ransom that is demanded.
Paying the ransom, though costly, may be much cheaper than paying the
restoration costs that will be incurred if the ransomware program is not
“unlocked” by the hacker.19 These restoration costs, under the terms of the
typical cyber policy, will be borne by the insurer rather than the insured.20
Thus, a simple cost-benefit analysis will, on this view, inevitably lead the
insurer to prefer paying the ransom. Hackers understand this logic, which
gives them a strong incentive to identify and attack organizations that have
cyber insurance coverage.21 This dynamic leads to more hacking and
ransomware attacks overall, which increases demand for cyber insurance. As
a result, insurers can sell more policies for higher premiums than before. And
the cycle continues. The (mostly implied) conclusion of such analyses is that

Ransomware: Cyber-Insurance Payouts Are Adding to the Problem, Warn Security
Experts, ZDNET (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomwarecyber-insurance-payouts-are-adding-to-the-problem-warn-security-experts/.
16
Dudley, supra note 10. See also Victoria Hudgins, Rising Ransomware
Attacks Spur Debate over Whether Cyber Insurance Is to Blame, LAW.COM:
LEGALTECH NEWS (Dec. 4, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/
2020/12/04/rising-ransomware-attacks-spur-debate-over-whether-cyber-insuranceis-to-blame/?slreturn=20201110104215; Palmer, supra note 15.
17
Dudley, supra note 10.
18
Id.
19
Id. (discussing multiple circumstances where it was cheaper to pay ransom).
20
See infra Part III (describing the structures of a cyber insurance policy and its
ransomware coverage).
21
Indeed, it appears hackers are threatening to act on the incentive. See Chris
Beck & Blake Fleisher, Does It Ever Make Sense for Firms to Pay Ransomware
Criminals?, INS. J. (July 8, 2021), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
international/2021/07/08/620508.htm; Hudgins, supra note 16.
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we would be better off if the market for ransomware insurance were to
disappear.22
This claim has gained traction in the popular media, government
officials, members of the legal profession, and commentators in academia.
The former head of the U.K.’s National Cyber Security Center, Ciaran
Martin, for example, recently asserted that the ransomware problem is being
fueled by the absence of legal barriers to organizations paying ransoms and
filing insurance claims.23 Martin went on to suggest the possibility of an
outright ban on insurance coverage for ransomware payments.24 The U.S.
Department of the Treasury, through the OFAC, issued an advisory
highlighting existing federal law that authorizes steep fines on U.S. persons,
individuals and entities who make payments to parties under sanction by the
U.S. government.25 The narrative that ransomware insurance makes
businesses a target has been embraced by privacy and data security lawyers
as well. As one attorney put it, a reason hackers target small to medium-sized
companies and municipalities, which probably do not have large amounts of
cash in the bank for paying ransom demands, is that such entities are likely
to have insurance coverage.26
This idea—that the presence of insurance coverage actually
encourages ransomware attacks—is an example of a more general
phenomenon recently identified by two legal scholars as the problem of

22

There is some possibility that this could happen. One large cyber insurer,
AXA, which had been providing ransomware coverage, has—at the request of
French government officials—decided to stop selling cyber insurance in France that
reimburses extortion payments to ransomware criminals. Frank Bajak, Insurer AXA
to Stop Paying Ransomware Crime Payments in France, INS. J. (May 9, 2021),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2021/05/09/613255.htm.
23
Dan Sabbagh, Insurers ‘Funding Organised Crime’ by Paying Ransomware
Claims, GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/
jan/24/insurers-funding-organised-by-paying-ransomware-claims.
24
Id.
25
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury’s Off. of Foreign Assets Control, Advisory on
Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ofac_ransomware_advisory_10012020_
1.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury’s Advisory]. See infra notes 232–45
and accompanying text.
26
Hudgins, supra note 16 (quoting Philip Yannella, privacy and data security
group practice leader at Ballard Spahr).
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“third-party moral hazard.”27 In a paper entitled The Paradox of Insurance,
Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman explore the potential for
insurance to create significant negative externalities through incentives for
third parties—that is, parties other than the insureds or the insurers—to
“engage in antisocial, illegal and unethical activities in order to extract
money from insureds or insurers.”28 The basic idea is straightforward and
persuasive. If a third-party is interested in extorting or defrauding (or, in any
way, illegally extracting) money from another individual or organization, the
fact that the target individual or organization has insurance for such a
payment can increase the third-party’s incentives to undertake such a scheme
and can influence how much money they try to extract.29 The more money is
available to pay an extortion demand, all else equal, the more profitable the
extortion demand can be. Although Parchomovsky and Siegelman do not
address ransomware insurance specifically, they do address kidnap-andransom (“K&R”) insurance, which has obvious similarities with ransomware
coverage.30
What should be done about the third-party moral hazard effects of
ransomware insurance? One suggested solution is to ban such coverage,
either as general ban on making ransom payments or as a narrower ban on
the insurance industry from selling coverage for such payments.31 The
27
Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, The Paradox of Insurance (Univ.
of Penn. Inst. for L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 20-20), https://
scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3160&context=faculty_sch
olarship.
28
Id. at 2.
29
Id. at 4, 9–10.
30
Id. at 6 (“But perhaps the case that best illustrates the paradox of insurance is
kidnap insurance.”). In a footnote to this statement, they then acknowledge that
“kidnap insurance has evolved various techniques to mitigate third party moral
hazard.” Id. at n.7 (citing Anja Shortland, Governing Kidnap for Ransom: Lloyd’s
as a “Private Regime”, 30 GOVERNANCE 283 (2017)). Parchomovsky and
Siegelman also cite to other recent works on kidnapping and insurance. See, e.g.,
Alexander Fink & Mark Pingle, Kidnap Insurance and Its Impact on Kidnapping
Outcomes, 160 PUB. CHOICE 481 (2014). We discuss the work of Parchomovsky and
Siegleman as well as the work of Anja Shortland and their relevance to the
ransomware insurance case below. See infra Part III & Part IV.B.1.
31
One threat analyst has claimed that “[p]rohibiting ransomware payments is
the quickest and most effective way to end ransomware attacks.” Jason Breslow,
How to Stop Ransomware Attacks? 1 Proposal Would Prohibit Victims from Paying
Up, NPR (May 13, 2021, 12:03 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/05/13/996299367/
how-to-stop-ransomware-attacks-1-proposal-would-prohibit-victims-from-paying-
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reasoning for such a ban is simple and compelling. If ransom payments, or
the insurance for ransom payments, were to be prohibited by law (e.g., under
penalty of heavy fines), the likelihood that a ransomware victim would
actually make the ransom payment would decrease. And if ransomware
targets are less likely to pay, or the amounts they are willing to pay are
diminished (because of the lack of insurance funds as a potential source of
financing), the hackers’ incentive to demand a ransom would also be
diminished. This reasoning not only serves as the basis for recent calls to
enact bans on ransomware payments and ransomware insurance, it has for
many years also served as the basis for calls to ban ransom payments and
ransom insurance in the kidnapping setting.32
Assuming that the primary motivation for most ransomware attacks
is financial, as seems to be the case (at least for now),33 this argument has
some obvious merit. However, it fails to take into account the practical and
moral limitations that would be raised by a comprehensive ban on
ransomware payments and insurance coverage.34 Given the explosion in the
up (quoting Brett Callow, threat analyst with Emsisoft). See also Emer Scully, Ex
GCHQ Boss Calls for Ban on Ransom Payments to Hackers After Criminals
Targeted Hospitals in Ireland and Largest Pipeline in US Closed Due to Cyber
Attack, DAILYMAIL (May 15, 2021), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article9581635/Ex-GCHQ-boss-calls-ban-ransom-payments-criminals-targeted-hospitalsIreland.html; Phil Goldstein, New York May Ban Ransomware Payments from
Municipalities, STATETECH MAG. (Mar. 9, 2020), https://statetechmagazine.com/
article/2020/03/new-york-may-ban-ransomware-payments-municipalities.
32
See, e.g., Yvonne M. Dutton & Jon Bellish, Refusing to Negotiate: Analyzing
the Legality and Practicality of a Piracy Ransom Ban, 47 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 299
(2014).
33
Most of the reporting on the rise of ransomware attacks indicates that profit
is the primary motive. See, e.g., Alexander S. Gillis & Ben Lutkevich, Definition:
Ransomware, TECHTARGET, https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/definition/
ransomware (last updated Dec. 2021). To the extent ransomware attacks are not
about profit-maximization for the attackers, but rather are part of either a terrorist
plot or cyber hybrid warfare effort on the part of a nation to another nation’s
economy (as was the case for the massive NotPetya attack), it is not clear that the
extortion economy story would apply in the same way, and it is therefore not clear
that the same responses would be called for. For discussion on the NotPetya attack,
see infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
34
So far as we are aware, the U.S. government has never enforced a ban on a
particular type of insurance categorically. As we discuss below, however, there is a
statutory ban on payments to individuals and organizations subject to U.S. sanctions,
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sheer number of ransomware attacks in recent years,35 enforcing a universal
ban on all ransomware payouts by individual victims would be impractical.
It would be a daunting administrative undertaking for the government to
monitor thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of organizations and
individuals to ensure compliance with a comprehensive ransom ban,
especially given the difficulty of tracking cryptocurrency transactions.36 In
addition, if bans on ransomware insurance ended up curtailing all insurance
coverage for ransomware attacks, we would lose all of the potential
regulatory benefits that insurance can provide. Put another way, when
insurance companies provide coverage for a particular risk, they have
incentives in competing for business to help their insureds find methods to
minimize their risks.37 Banning insurance in this part of the cyber risk market
would eliminate that potential regulatory benefit that insurance provides, in
which ban on its face does seem to apply to ransom payments by insurers. Whether
that ban is enforced is another matter. See infra Part IV.B.
35
There have been thousands of ransomware attacks reported in recent years.
The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (“IC3”) asserts there were 2,474
ransomware incidents reported in 2020 and a 225 percent increase in ransom
demands. CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, AA21-243A,
NATIONAL CYBER AWARENESS SYSTEM ALERT: RANSOMWARE AWARENESS FOR
HOLIDAYS AND WEEKENDS 2 (2022), https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/
publications/AA21-243ARansomware_Awareness_for_Holidays_and_Weekends.pdf. Then IC3 received
2,084 complaints in the first half of 2021. Id. Several times that number goes
unreported. Gerrit De Vynck, Many Ransomware Attacks Go Unreported. The FBI
and Congress Want to Change That, WASH. POST (July 27, 2021, 7:32 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/07/27/fbi-congressransomware-laws/ (quoting Eric Goldstein, executive assistant director at CISA, as
saying, “[w]e believe that only about a quarter of ransomware intrusions are actually
reported.”).
36
See infra notes 99–110 and accompanying text.
37
For a discussion of the ways in which various types of insurance seek to
reduce insured’s losses, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK:
INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 57 (1986); RICHARD V. ERICSON,
AARON DOYLE & DEAN BARRY, INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE (2003); Tom Baker
& Thomas O. Farrish, Liability Insurance & the Regulation of Firearms, in SUING
THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS
TORTS 292 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005); and Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue,
Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV.
197 (2012). We discuss insurance as a source of cyber risk regulation further below.
See infra Part IV.B.

2021

THE CASE FOR BANNING (AND MANDATING)
RANSOMEWARE INSURANCE

257

addition to the obvious risk-spreading benefit. What’s more, a ban on
ransomware payments and ransomware insurance raises moral and practical
concerns. Would the ban require imposing a serious punishment on, say, a
hospital administrator who decides to pay a ransomware demand rather than
risk the lives of its patients, or on the insurer who facilitates that payment?
On the other hand, even if one were to conclude that ransomware
insurance should not be banned in all circumstances, such a conclusion
would not imply that all government intervention in the ransomware
insurance market is a bad idea. For starters, any insurance contract that
covers ransomware attacks should be subject to the same sorts of regulatory
safeguards and common-law doctrines that govern other aspects of the
insurance relationship between insurers and their policyholders.38 Further,
the potential regulatory or governance function of insurance has natural
limitations. For example, ransomware insurers themselves externalize some
of the costs of ransomware attacks, which means that their incentives as
regulators will not be optimal, which provides additional potential roles for
government intervention.39
For these reasons, this Article considers a different approach,
primarily as a thought experiment. First, to interrupt the extortion economy
described above, we could institute a federal ban on insurance coverage for
ransomware payments. This ban would apply to all insurance payouts for
38

The insurance industry is regulated at the state level. The seven main
functional types of state insurance regulation include “(1) licensing (of insurance
companies and intermediaries), (2) taxation, (3) solvency, (4) rates, (5) forms, (6)
access and availability, and (7) market conduct.” TOM BAKER, KYLE D. LOGUE, &
CHAIM SAIMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 142 (5th ed.
2021). In addition, insurance contracts are subject to the same sorts of interpretive
principles and common law doctrines that apply to other contracts and that serve to
protect the reasonable expectations of the insureds and the insurers. Such doctrines
include contra proferentem, waiver and estoppel, misrepresentation, and the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. See id. at ch.2. See also infra Part II.C.
39
As Shortland points out, in the kidnap-and-ransom insurance market, the
reinsurer Lloyd’s of London helps to internalize these externalities by serving a sort
of industry coordinating function. SHORTLAND, supra note 11, at 176–77. See also
Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 27, at 34–35 (noting Shortland’s conclusion
regarding the beneficial coordination role that Lloyd’s plays int the K&R market).
We discuss below why reinsurers are less likely to play such a coordinating role in
the ransomware insurance market and thus why government intervention may be
necessary. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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ransom payments except in situations involving substantial threat to human
health or life. Second, with respect to coverage for the other losses associated
with ransomware attacks (including the costs of restoring victims’ computer
networks as well as business interruption coverage), not only would there be
no ban, there would be a mandate that all commercial property and casualty
insurers offer such coverage in a standalone policy that contains a reasonable
amount of coverage—that is, with policy limits that provide substantial
coverage in the event of an attack. Third, to encourage the purchase of such
coverage, lawmakers could enact some sort of federal subsidy for the
purchase of cyber insurance. The most obvious candidate would be an
insurer-side subsidy in the form of a federal backstop or reinsurance
program, similar to the sort of program that is already in place for terrorism
insurance.40 But if such a program did not prove to be a sufficient subsidy
and not enough organizations end up purchasing cyber insurance coverage,
there are other, more extreme (less politically plausible, but perhaps more
interesting), options such as a buyer-side subsidy or even a mandate. This
would be similar to compulsory auto liability insurance or healthcare
coverage under the Affordable Care Act.41
This Article unfolds as follows. Part II provides a brief overview of
the phenomenon of ransomware attacks—how they evolved from prior
generations of cyberattacks, what forms the attacks tend to take now, and
how the hackers secure their ransom. Part III considers the development of
cyber insurance, with a special emphasis on coverage for ransomware attacks
and how ransom negotiations are carried out in the shadow of the existing
contractual obligation represented in the cyber insurance policy. Part III
describes the structure of the ransomware insurance contract, and how the
dynamics in the ransomware coverage market and the doctrines of insurance
40

See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, 116 Stat.
2322 (2002). See infra Part IV.B.1.
41
Every state has some form of automobile financial responsibility law, which
typically requires some minimal level of auto liability insurance coverage. See
Vehicle Liability Insurance Requirements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/vehicle-liability-insurance-requirements/ (last visited Apr. 1,
2022). See generally Automobile Financial Responsibility Laws by State, INS. INFO.
INST., https://www.iii.org/automobile-financial-responsibility-laws-by-state (last
updated July 2018). The Affordable Care Act originally required most people to
purchase health insurance. CHRISTINE EIBNER & SARAH A. NOWAK, THE EFFECT OF
ELIMINATING THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE PENALTY AND THE ROLE OF BEHAVIORAL
FACTORS 1 (2018), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/201807/Eibner_individual_mandate_repeal.pdf. In 2017 Congress repealed the penalty
for noncompliance with the mandate. Id.
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law (such as the duty of good faith and fair dealing) can influence how the
ransom negotiations play out. Part IV elaborates on the argument that
ransomware insurance for ransom payments, on balance, is harmful to
society. It also complicates the picture by explaining the substantial costs of
instituting a comprehensive ban on all ransomware insurance and
ransomware payouts, but emphasizes some of the benefits of ransomware
insurance, including the risk-spreading and regulatory benefits of such
coverage. Part V develops the idea of a limited ban on insurance for
ransomware payments, with exceptions (perhaps granted selectively and
discreetly by a regulatory body such as the OFAC) for cases involving threats
to life and limb, coupled with federally subsidized and mandated coverage
for the other costs of ransomware attacks. Part VI briefly concludes.
I.

A BRIEF RANSOMWARE OVERVIEW

In 1989 the first ransomware attack locked computers at the World
Health Organization’s International AIDS Conference.42 Employing stoneage level sophistication by present standards, the hacker attended the
conference and handed out floppy disks to attendees.43 He told the
conference attendees the disks contained a program to predict the risk of
contracting AIDS.44 Once installed, the program had a very simple trigger:
after ninety on-off boot-cycles, the ransomware would lock the user’s
computer and tell the user to send $189 to a post office box in Panama to get
the key.45 The hacker was quickly tracked down and arrested for his crimes,
though he was ultimately declared mentally unfit for trial.46
The ransomware landscape has changed significantly in the last
thirty years as they have become more common and more sophisticated.
They have adopted stealthier techniques including threatening to publish
sensitive data and using the potential for government fines from disclosure
42

Samantha Murphy Kelly, The Bizarre Story of the Inventor of Ransomware,
CNN: BUS., https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/16/tech/ransomware-joseph-popp/
index.html (May 16, 2021, 12:46 PM).
43
Id.
44
Juliana De Groot, A History of Ransomware Attacks: The Biggest and Worst
Ransomware Attacks of All Time, DIGIT. GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2022),
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/history-ransomware-attacks-biggest-and-worstransomware-attacks-all-time.
45
Kelly, supra note 42.
46
Id.
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of such data to extort payments.47 Ransomware attacks have also become
more expensive. According to estimates, in 2019 ransom demands reached
$6.3 billion48 and the total cost of ransom payments and downtime reached
at least $42 billion.49
In 2017, ransomware began to make headlines. The WannaCry and
NotPetya attacks disabled computers around the globe.50 WannaCry infected
300,000 computers in 150 countries on six continents.51 NotPetya has been
called “the most devastating cyberattack in history.”52 It froze systems
worldwide, including computers at shipping-titan Maersk, pharmaceuticalbehemoth Merck, and snack-food giant Mondelez.53
47

Lucian Constantin, More Targeted, Sophisticated and Costly: Why
Ransomware Might be Your Biggest Threat, CSO: ONLINE (Feb. 10, 2020, 3:00
AM),
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3518864/more-targeted-sophisticatedand-costly-why-ransomware-might-be-your-biggest-threat.html; Catherine Stupp,
Hackers Get More Sophisticated with Ransomware Attacks, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18,
2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hackers-get-more-sophisticatedwith-ransomware-attacks-11576665001.
48
Business Interruption Drives 60% of Cyber Losses: Allianz, BUS. INS. (Nov.
19, 2020, 10:21 AM), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20201119/
NEWS06/912337901?template=printart.
49
Jack M. Germain, New Report Profiles Ransomware Cybergangs,
TECHNEWSWORLD (May 21, 2021, 4:00 AM), https://www.technewsworld.com/
story/new-report-profiles-ransomware-cybergangs-87139.html; Report: The Cost of
Ransomware in 2020. A Country-By-Country Analysis, EMSISOFT: BLOG (Feb. 11,
2020), https://blog.emsisoft.com/en/35583/report-the-cost-of-ransomware-in-2020a-country-by-country-analysis/.
50
Alex Hern, WannaCry, Petya, NotPetya: How Ransomware Hit the Big Time
in 2017, GUARDIAN (Dec. 30, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2017/dec/30/wannacry-petya-notpetya-ransomware.
51
Selena Larson, Why WannaCry Ransomware Took Down So Many
Businesses, CNN: BUS. (May 17, 2017, 1:54 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/05/
17/technology/wannacry-ransomware-business-security/index.html.
52
Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating
Cyberattack in History, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/
story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/. This particular
attack appears to have been coordinated by the Russian government as part of a
hybrid warfare campaign initially against Ukraine. Ellen Nakashima, Russian
Military Was Behind “NotPetya” Cyberattack in Ukraine, CIA Concludes, WASH.
POST (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
russian-military-was-behind-notpetya-cyberattack-in-ukraine-ciaconcludes/2018/01/12/048d8506-f7ca-11e7-b34a-b85626af34ef_story.html.
53
Greenberg, supra note 52.

2021

THE CASE FOR BANNING (AND MANDATING)
RANSOMEWARE INSURANCE

261

Just as spectacularly as ransomware entered the public
consciousness with these two attacks, it fell out of favor with criminals for a
period in 2018.54 Hackers had moved on to other modes of attacks. For
example, cryptojacking—the theft of computer resources to mine
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin—increased during this period by 450%.55
Then, in 2019, ransomware attacks returned with a vengeance.56
The lack of mandatory reporting and a centralized information
repository makes the scope of the problem difficult to determine.57 But
reports suggest the number of attacks increased in 2019. McAfee Labs
reported a 118% increase in ransomware attacks in the first quarter.58
Criminals captured the public’s attention with attacks on major cities,
including Atlanta, New Orleans, and Baltimore.59 Their targets included
hospitals in the U.S. and abroad, forcing them to turn away all but the most

54

Danny Palmer, Cybercrime: Ransomware Attacks Have More Than Doubled
This Year, ZDNET (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyber-crimeransomware-attacks-have-more-than-doubled-this-year/.
55
Josh Fruhlinger, Recent Ransomware Attacks Define the Malware’s New Age,
CSO (Feb. 20, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3212260/recentransomware-attacks-define-the-malwares-new-age.html.
56
See Barlyn, supra note 3 (suggesting spike in 2019); Nathaniel Popper,
Ransomware Attacks Grow, Crippling Cities and Businesses, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/09/technology/ransomware-attacks.html
(“In 2019, 205,280 organizations submitted files that had been hacked in a
ransomware attack — a 41 percent increase from the year before . . . .”).
57
In contrast to the numbers reported in a prior paragraph, an FBI report claimed
that losses totaled just over $8.9 million in 2019. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS
INTERNET CRIME COMPLIANCE CTR., 2019 INTERNET CRIME REPORT 14 (2019),
https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2019_IC3Report.pdf. The stark
difference stems from just 2,047 being reported to the bureau in 2019. Id. The
number also does not include “lost business, time, wages, files, or equipment, or any
third party remediation services acquired by a victim.” Id. at 20.
58
CHRISTIAAN BEEK ET AL., MCAFEE LAB THREATS REPORT 1 (Aug. 2019 ed.
2019), https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/assets/reports/rp-quarterly-threats
-aug-2019.pdf.
59
See Popper, supra note 56; Manny Fernandez, David E. Sanger & Marina
Trahan Martinez, Ransomware Attacks Are Testing Resolve of Cities Across
America, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/us/
ransomware-attacks-hacking.html.
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critical patients.60 In total, “113 state and municipal governments and
agencies, 764 healthcare providers, and 89 universities, colleges, and school
districts” fell victim to ransomware attacks.61 Despite the increase, criminals
are employing an evolving strategy. Security experts indicate that the
number of ransomware detections in businesses rose 365% between the
second quarter of 2018 and second quarter of 2019, though consumer
detections declined.62 There is also some evidence the attacks continued to
rise during 2020, notwithstanding, or perhaps due to, the Covid-19
pandemic.63
Historically, hackers adopted a “spray and pray” opportunistic
approach.64 Criminals used automated systems to send numerous spam
emails and fake advertisements hoping to infiltrate users’ systems.65 Once
the recipient clicked on the link within these emails and advertisements, the
malware downloaded and the user’s files were encrypted.66 The attacks
typically were successful in infiltrating individuals’ and small businesses’
computers—entities with fewer resources to defend their systems.67 Small
ransom demands meant criminals’ efforts were only financially worthwhile
if a significant number of computers were successfully infected.68 But
60

See The State of Ransomware in the US: Report and Statistics 2019,
EMSISOFT: BLOG (Dec. 31, 2019), https://blog.emsisoft.com/en/34822/the-state-ofransomware-in-the-us-report-and-statistics-2019/.
61
Id.
62
Alicia DeNisco Rayome, Ransomware Attacks on Businesses Up 365% This
Year, TECHREPUBLIC (Aug. 8, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/
article/ransomware-attacks-on-businesses-up-365-this-year/.
63
See Brenda R. Sharton, Ransomware Attacks Are Spiking. Is your Company
Prepared?, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 20, 2021), https://hbr.org/2021/05/ransomwareattacks-are-spiking-is-your-company-prepared (citing studies showing that
ransomware attacks in 2020 “were up 150% over the previous year” and that the
“amount[s] paid by victims of these attacks increased more than 300% in 2020.”).
64
See Vadim Sedletsky, Opportunistic vs. Targeted Ransomware Attacks,
CYBERARK: BLOG (May 12, 2021), https://www.cyberark.com/resources/blog/
opportunistic-vs-targeted-ransomware-attacks.
65
See id.
66
See id.
67
See id. (attributing ransomware success rate to lack of proper security hygiene
for backups and recovery as well as, companies relying too heavily on traditional
anti-virus solutions that is not effective in blocking ransomware).
68
See Lena Yuryna Connolly, David S. Wall, Michael Lang & Bruce Oddson,
An Empirical Study of Ransomware Attacks on Organizations: An Assessment of
Severity and Salient Factors Affecting Vulnerability, J. CYBERSECURITY 1, 4 (2020)
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criminals are now taking a more targeted approach, focusing on particular
business sectors and entities.69 They are even attacking industrial control
systems—the systems responsible for running power grids, manufacturing
plants, oil refineries, and sewage treatment plants.70 They are gaining access
to their targets’ systems long before releasing the malware.71 And they are
conducting significant reconnaissance to better understand their target.72
This change in tactic has led to greater success in taking users’ files
hostage.73 However, phishing attacks are still widely used.74 Indeed, several
cities that were successfully held for ransom were infiltrated via phishing
emails.75 Ultimately, successful attacks increased by forty-one percent in
2019 from the prior year.76 Changing tactics have also raised the stakes for
entities that are breached, particularly those unwilling to pay ransoms.
In late 2019, reports came out that criminals were no longer just
encrypting users’ files and demanding a ransom payment; they were now
(noting victims are typically asked to pay “an amount that many organizations or
individuals can afford to pay, given that the loss of the data is unbearable for the
victim.”).
69
See Sedletsky, supra note 64.
70
Andy Greenberg, Mysterious New Ransomware Targets Industrial Control
Systems, WIRED (Feb. 3, 2020, 4:56 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/ekansransomware-industrial-control-systems/.
71
Sedletsky, supra note 64.
72
Id.
73
See Best Defense Against Spear Phishing Attacks: The Real Dangers of
Spear-Phishing Attacks, FIREEYE, https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/bestdefense-against-spear-phishing-attacks.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2022) (“People
open 3% of their spam and 70% of spear-phishing attempts. And 50% of those who
open the spear-phishing emails click on the links within the email—compared to 5%
for mass mailings—and they click on those links within an hour of receipt. A
campaign of 10 emails has a 90% chance of snaring its target.”).
74
See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS INTERNET CRIME COMPLIANCE CTR.,
2020 INTERNET CRIME REPORT 3 (2020), https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/Annual
Report/2020_IC3Report.pdf.
75
See, e.g., Fernandez, Sanger & Martinez, supra note 59 (discussing the
Allentown hack via a phishing email); Rachael Thomas, 7 Florida Municipalities
Have Fallen Prey to Cyber Attacks Since Last Year, NAPLES DAILY NEWS (Aug. 20,
2019, 5:14 PM), https://www.naplesnews.com/story/news/crime/2019/08/20/7florida-municipalities-have-fallen-prey-cyber-attacks-ryuk-ransomware-phishing/
2065063001/.
76
Popper, supra note 56.
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also downloading and threatening to release sensitive data from the target’s
system if the victim did not pay the ransom.77 These threats may significantly
alter the calculus to determine whether to pay the ransom. No longer is the
high cost of restoring systems the only consequence of not paying the
ransom, particularly as criminals make good on their threats. For example,
in February 2020, hackers released a trove of confidential data from a
personal injury law firm in Texas.78 The data included, “pain diaries from
personal injury cases, fee agreements, HIPPA consent forms, and more.”79
This was not the first time this criminal organization had released data from
a victim who refused to pay the ransom. In late 2019, the group released data
from Southwire, a cable and wire manufacturer in Georgia, after it refused
to pay a $6 million ransom.80 Despite the company’s best efforts, and court
orders to stop releasing the information and take down the website, the group
continued to publish the data online.81
The changing nature of the attacks is also driving up the costs of
ransomware. Ransom demands and payments have increased.82 Other costs
77

See, e.g., Jenni Bergal, Hackers Threaten to Release Police Records, Knock
911 Offline, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS: STATELINE (May 14, 2021),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2021/05/14/
hackers-threaten-to-release-police-records-knock-911-offline.
78
Patrick Smith, Maze Hackers Publish Texas Law Firm’s Confidential Data,
LAW.COM (Feb. 11, 2020, 9:44 AM), https://www.law.com/2020/02/11/mazehackers-delist-texas-law-firm-as-ransom-pressures-mount/.
79
Id.
80
Jessica Saunders, Reports: Southwire Incident Was Ransomware Attack
Seeking Bitcoin Worth $6M, BUS. J.: ATLANTA BUS. CHRON. (Dec. 17, 2019, 6:27
AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2019/12/17/reports-southwireincident-was-ransomware-attack.html.
81
Lawrence Abrams, Maze Ransomware Publishes 14GB of Stolen Southwire
Files, BLEEPING COMPUT. (Jan. 10, 2020, 5:13 PM), https://
www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/maze-ransomware-publishes-14gb-ofstolen-southwire-files/. The group ultimately ceased operations in 2020. Maria
Henriquez, Maze Ransomware Gang Retires, SEC. MAG. (Nov. 3, 2020),
https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/93819-maze-ransomware-gang-retires.
82
Indeed, the demands and payments have both reached eight figures. Criminals
demanded $70 million to unlock computers affected by REvil group’s ransomware
attack on Kaseya VSA, a software used by large companies and technology-service
providers to manage and distribute updates. Rachel Lerman & Gerrit De Vynck,
Hackers Demand $70 Million to Unlock Businesses Hit by Sprawling Ransomware
Attack, WASH. POST (July 5, 2021, 4:39 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2021/07/05/kayesa-ransomware-70-million-fbi/. The attack affected
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are also going up. As these attacks become more sophisticated, costs
associated with recovery increase, as does lost revenue and reputational
harm. The average length of downtime has increased, reaching as high as
sixteen days in the fourth quarter of 2019.83 Sources attribute this increased
downtime to the successful attacks against larger enterprises.84 As a result,
the average cost of downtime in 2020 reached $283,000—an increase of
almost 100% from the prior year.85
The situation grew worse in 2020. The DOJ declared 2020 the
“worst year ever” for extortion-related cybercrimes.86 According to antivirus
firm Emsisoft, the average ransom request reached $200,000 in 2020.87
Despite the global pandemic that began early in 2020, ransomware attacks
focused on hospitals.88 Attacks were more profitable for ransomware gangs

thousands of victims in at least seventeen countries who rely on Kaseya’s software.
Id. And in June 2021, JB USA Holdings Inc., the world’s largest meat supplier,
actually paid an $11 million dollar ransom demand after cybercriminals took out its
processing plants. Jacob Bunge, JBS Paid $11 Million to Resolve Ransomware
Attack, WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2021, 8:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/jbs-paid11-million-to-resolve-ransomware-attack-11623280781.
83
Ransomware Costs Double in Q4 as Ryuk, Sodinokibi Proliferate,
COVEWARE (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.coveware.com/blog/2020/1/22/
ransomware-costs-double-in-q4-as-ryuk-sodinokibi-proliferate.
84
Id.
85
Aleksandar Kochovski, Ransomware Statistics, Trends and Facts for 2022
and Beyond, CLOUDWARDS (Mar. 22, 2022), https://www.cloudwards.net/
ransomware-statistics/.
86
Dustin Volz, Ransomware Targeted by New Justice Department Task Force,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2021, 10:09 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ransomwaretargeted-by-new-justice-department-task-force-11619014158?page=1.
87
Ransomware Demands Continue to Rise as Data Exfiltration Becomes
Common, and Maze Subdues, COVEWARE (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.coveware.
com/blog/q3-2020-ransomware-marketplace-report.
88
CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION & DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., AA20-302A, RANSOMWARE
ACTIVITY TARGETING THE HEALTHCARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH SECTOR (2020),
https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/AA20302A_Ransomware%20_Activity_Targeting_the_Healthcare_and_Public_Health_
Sector.pdf.
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too. They made at least $350 million—a 311% increase over 2019.89 Once
again, the criminals laundered their cryptocurrency payments through
Bitcoin mixing services.90 But research suggests that the bulk of that money
travels through just a few exchange portals, potentially giving law
enforcement an opportunity to disrupt the cash flow of ransomware gangs.91
It is difficult to determine how many attacks occur each year, and it
is similarly difficult to say for certain what percentage of victims pay the
ransom. But a recent survey of businesses found that twenty percent of
ransomware victims paid the ransom in 2020—up from only fifteen percent
in 2019 and four percent in 2018.92 Among these, several local governments
opted to pay the demand rather than attempt to restore the systems
themselves. The city of Riviera Beach, Florida paid the largest of these
ransoms—sixty-five bitcoins worth approximately $600,000.93 Similarly,
Lake City, Florida paid forty-two bitcoins worth nearly $500,000 to unlock
its systems.94 Other local governments, however, have not. The city of New

89

KIM GRAUER & HENRY UPDEGRAVE, THE 2021 CRYPTO CRIME REPORT 6
(2021),
https://go.chainalysis.com/rs/503-FAP-074/images/Chainalysis-CryptoCrime-2021.pdf.
90
Id. at 4, 9.
91
Id. at 9, 18.
92
THREAT POST 2021: THE EVOLUTION OF RANSOMWARE 17 (2021),
https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/04/19080601/
0354039421fd7c82eb4e1b4a7c90f98e.pdf (“A full 80 percent said they didn’t pay
the ransom.”); DARK READING, HOW DATA BREACHES AFFECT THE ENTERPRISE 12
(2019),
https://dsimg.ubm-us.net/envelope/412603/623683/F_1210_P1_13040_
DR19_Report_Strategic_Security_2_Data_Breaches.pdf (noting 15 percent paid the
demanded ransom in 2019 compared to four percent in 2018).
93
Benjamin Freed, Florida City Pays Hackers $600,000 After Ransomware
Attack, STATESCOOP (June 20, 2019), https://statescoop.com/florida-city-payshackers-600000-after-ransomware-attack/. The city’s insurer negotiated with the
hackers and ultimately paid the ransom, leaving the city responsible for only its
$25,000 deductible. D. Howard Kass, Riviera Beach, Florida Ransomware Attack:
City Pays $600,000, MSSP ALERT (June 20, 2019), https://www.msspalert.com/
cybersecurity-breaches-and-attacks/ransomware/riviera-beach-florida-malwareattack/.
94
Catalin Cimpanu, Second Florida City Pays Giant Ransom to Ransomwarre
Gang in a Week, ZDNET (June 26, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/secondflorida-city-pays-giant-ransom-to-ransomware-gang-in-a-week/. The city was
responsible for its $10,000 deductible. Ian Duncan, As Florida Cities Use Insurance
to Pay $1 Million in Ransoms to Hackers, Baltimore and Maryland Weigh Getting
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Bedford, Massachusetts, for example, chose to restore its systems from
backups after hackers demanded more than $5 million in ransom and rejected
a counteroffer of $400,000.95 In addition to the changing size of ransom
demands, the form of ransom payment has come a long way since victims
were asked to mail a check to a post-office box in 1989.96 Criminals typically
demand payment be made in cryptocurrency—frequently in bitcoin.97
Indeed, ninety-nine percent of ransoms paid in cryptocurrency in 2019 were
delivered using bitcoin.98
Introduced in 2008, Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer cryptocurrency that
allows rapid, reliable, and pseudo-anonymous payments.99 Cryptocurrency,
unlike a traditional bank wire or check-deposit, can be difficult to trace.100
Indeed, in its early days, Bitcoin was thought to be completely anonymous
and untraceable by law enforcement.101 That myth has slowly unraveled but
uncovering the identity of a Bitcoin user remains a difficult task.102 In fact,
some law enforcement officials rely on a criminal’s mistakes to track them.
In 2013, the FBI was able to identify Ross Ulbricht, the individual behind
Silk Road—the dark web’s one-stop-shop for illicit goods and services—
because he was careless.103 Ulbricht used a pseudonym for Bitcoin

Covered, BALT. SUN (July 5, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/
maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-cyber-insurance-20190703-story.html.
95
Lindsey O’Donnell, $5.3M Ransomware Demand: Massachusetts City Says
No Thanks, THREATPOST (Sept. 5, 2019, 11:14 AM), https://threatpost.com/
ransomware-demand-massachusetts-city-no-thanks/148034/.
96
See supra text accompanying notes 42–46.
97
See MacKenzie Sigalos, When Ransomware Strikes, This Company Helps
Victims Make Bitcoin Payments, CNBC (June 10, 2021, 3:51 PM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2021/06/10/digitalmint-helps-ransomware-victims-make-bitcoinpayments.html.
98
Ransomware Payments Up 33% as Maze and Sodinokibi Proliferate in Q1
2020, COVEWARE (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.coveware.com/blog/q1-2020ransomware-marketplace-report.
99
John Bohannon, Why Criminals Can’t Hide Behind Bitcoin, SCI. (Mar. 9,
2016),
https://www.science.org/content/article/why-criminals-cant-hide-behindbitcoin-rev2.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
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transactions that he had adopted years earlier on an internet forum.104 The
FBI was able to use this clue to determine his identity.105
Many criminals take extra precautions to make cryptocurrency
transactions more difficult to trace, including using “mixing services.”106
These services mix multiple individuals’ Bitcoin transactions, functionally
laundering the money in an effort to end the trail.107 “The forensic trail shows
the money going in but then goes cold because it is impossible to know which
Bitcoins belong to whom on the other end.”108 But even mixing services have
exploitable weaknesses when dealing with large sums of money.109 Despite
these issues, transacting in Bitcoin remains a reasonably effective method of
masking criminals’ identity. New cryptocurrencies hope to address the
vulnerabilities in Bitcoin.110
In sum, ransomware has become both an enormous source of profit
for criminals and an enormous cost for target organizations. It is
unsurprising, then, that those organizations would seek to use insurance as a
way of helping them manage the risk of ransomware attacks.
II.

THE CYBER INSURANCE MARKET
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CYBER INSURANCE

It should be no surprise, then, that the significant increase in cyber
threats, including the increased threat of ransomware attacks, has fueled a
growing market for insurance against cyber-related losses.111 In the early
104

Id.
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. (discussing Shadow, a new anonymous online market which uses its own
cryptocurrency called ShadowCash).
111
See 4 BERT WELLS, RUKESH KORDE & TERESA LEWI, NEW APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE LAW § 29.01(1) (Jeffrey E. Thomas & Aviva Abramovsky eds., Library
ed. 2020); Kim Lindros & Ed Tittel, What is Cyber Insurance and Why You Need It,
CIO (May 4, 2016, 4:43 AM), http://web.archive.org/web/20160505221841/
https://www.cio.com/article/3065655/cyber-attacks-espionage/what-is-cyberinsurance-and-why-you-need-it.html; Adam Janofsky, Why Companies Should
Prepare for More Data Breach Lawsuits, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2017, 5:12 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-companies-should-prepare-for-more-data105
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years of cyber-attacks, victims sought coverage for the fall out from cyberattacks from their commercial property or general liability insurance
policies, since those policies (at least the older ones) did not have clear cyberrisk exclusions.112 Indeed, that is still true for some property and liability
policies.113 Insurers, however, have resisted the effort to find coverage for
cyber-related claims under those types of policies, and the results in the
courts are mixed. For example, in America Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury
Insurance Co., the Fourth Circuit held that computer data, software, and
systems were not tangible property under commercial general liability
(“CGL”) provisions providing property damage coverage.114 By contrast, in
Computer Corner, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., a New Mexico
district court held that data stored on a hard drive did constitute covered
tangible property.115 In 2001, the Insurance Services Office (“ISO”)
breach-lawsuits-1512563334. There is some evidence, however, that the demand for
cyber insurance has levelled off as premiums have risen and budgets have become
tighter due to COVID-19. Tom Johansmeyer, Cybersecurity Insurance Has a Big
Problem, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 11, 2021), https://hbr.org/2021/01/cybersecurityinsurance-has-a-big-problem#. Despite a spate of attacks, companies are viewing
cyber insurance as a luxury. Id. Insurers and reinsurers are also becoming warier
about taking on cyber risks—the lack of data and the increasing number and cost of
attacks has made the insurance an unattractive proposition. Id.
112
See Robert H. Jerry, II & Michele L. Mekel, Cybercoverage for Cyber-Risks:
An Overview of Insurer’s Responses to the Perils of E-Commerce, 8 CONN. INS. L.J.
7, 15–23 (2001) (discussing the evolution of commercial general liability policies
through 2001); Anthony R. Zelle & Suzanne M. Whitehead, Cyber Liability: It’s
Just a Click Away, 33 J. INS. REG. 145, 151–52 (2014) (discussing the litigation
under pre-2001 commercial general liability policies); 4 WELLS, KORDE & LEWI,
supra note 111.
113
See, e.g., Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Mondelez Int’l, Inc. v. Zurich
Am. Ins. Co., No. 2018L011008 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 2018); Complaint & Demand
for Jury Trial, Merck & Co. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., No. UNN-L-002682-18 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. Aug. 2, 2018).
114
Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 89, 96 (4th Cir.
2003). See also State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Midwest Computs. & More, 147
F. Supp. 2d 1113 (W.D. Okla. 2001) (finding no coverage); Recall Total Info.
Mgmt., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 115 A.3d 458 (Conn. 2015) (finding no coverage);
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Sony Corp. of Am., No. 651982/2011, 2014 N.Y. Misc. Lexis
5141 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 21, 2014) (finding no coverage).
115
Comput. Corner, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., No. CV 97-10380, 2000
WL 35456791 (D.N.M. 2000).
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approved a change to the CGL coverage form designed apparently to make
it more explicit that cyber risks are excluded.116
In the ensuing coverage battles, courts have found no coverage for
cyber losses under the post-2001 CGL coverage form. In Innovak
International, Inc. v. Hanover Insurance, for example, a Florida district court
held that a CGL policy provided no coverage when the publication of
confidential data was the result of a third-party hacker, rather than the
insured.117 Similarly, in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance v. Rosen, a federal
district judge ruled the insurer did not have a duty to defend under a CGL
policy where a data breach was perpetrated by a third party.118 As a result of
similar decisions and the increase in cyber-attacks, the market for standalone
cyber risk insurance policies has taken off.119
Unlike many insurance policies, which use standardized language,
the language within cyber policies often varies between insurance companies
and policies.120 Still, cyber policies do tend to have some characteristics in
common. For starters, they all generally provide a variety of first and thirdparty coverages.121 Third-party coverage provides insurance for legal
liabilities, such as “claims arising out of, or alleging financial loss as a result
of a failure of the insured’s network security or a failure to protect
confidential information.”122 Such insurance fills the coverage gaps left by
the post-2001 CGL coverage form, but the frequency or magnitude of such
116

See, e.g., Jeff Woodward, The 2001 ISO GGL Revision, INT'L RISK MGMT.
INST., INC. (Jan. 2002), https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/the2001-iso-cgl-revision.
117
Innovak Int’l, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 280 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1349 (M.D.
Fla. 2017).
118
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Rosen Millennium, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 3d
1176, 1184–86 (M.D. Fla. 2018).
119
See ANDREW GRANATO & ANDY POLACEK, FED. RSRV. BANK OF CHI., CHI.
FED LETTER NO. 426, THE GROWTH AND CHALLENGES OF CYBER INSURANCE
(2019), https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/chicago-fed-letter/2019/426.
120
Id. at 1.
121
Shauhin A. Talesh, Insurance Companies as Corporate Regulators: The
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 475 (2017) (describing the
basics components of a typical cyber insurance policy). First-party coverage pays
for an insured’s own expenses, including costs related to investigating, reporting,
and correcting technological vulnerabilities. GRANATO & POLACEK, supra note 119,
at 2. Third-party coverage provides protection against legal claims brought by
individuals who might be harmed by the attack and who seek to hold the insuredtarget responsible. Id. at 1.
122
AIG CYBER COVER GUIDE, supra note 13.
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lawsuits is unclear. First-party cyber coverage can cover a broad range of
expenses. For example, cyber policies may provide coverage for the costs of
“notifications, public relations, and other services to assist in managing and
mitigating a cyber incident,”123 conducting a forensic investigation to
determine the cause of the event, restoring electronic data from backups,
business interruption,124 and ransom payments.125 At least one insurer
provides “towers of coverage”126—dividing costs into multiple categories to
ensure one kind of expense does not erode coverage for other kinds of
expenses.
B. RANSOMWARE INSURANCE127
Turning from cyber risk generally to ransomware risk, most modern
cyber insurance policies provide some sort of coverage for ransomware
attacks. Some companies provide ransomware coverage in their standard
cyber insurance policy. For example, AIG offers cyber extortion insurance
as part of its CyberEdge insurance policy, which provides coverage for a
wide variety of cyber risks.128 That policy defines loss with respect to
ransomware attacks to include “monies paid by an Insured with the Insurer’s
prior written consent to terminate or end a Security Threat or Privacy Threat
that would otherwise result in harm to an insured.”129 Other insurers offer
cyber extortion endorsements to their general cyber insurance, kidnap-andransom, or other insurance policies. Markel, a Virginia-based specialty and
small business insurance company, even offers such an endorsement to their
123

Id.
Id.
125
Id.
126
Understanding the Coverage, BEAZLEY, https://www.beazley.com/usa/
cyber_and_executive_risk/cyber_and_tech/beazley_breach_response/understandin
g_the_coverage.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
127
In Sections B and C, we rely in part on confidential telephone interviews
with several attorneys who work as or directly with cyber “breach coaches” in
response to ransomware attacks [hereinafter Confidential Interviews with
Attorneys].
128
AIG CYBER COVER GUIDE, supra note 13.
129
AM. INT’L GRP., INC., CyberEdge Cyber Extortion Insurance, in PORTFOLIO
SELECT FOR NON-PROFIT COMPANIES 111, 115 (2013), https://www.aig.com/
content/dam/aig/america-canada/us/documents/business/management-liability/
portfolioselect-for-public-companies-specimen-policy-brochure.pdf.
124
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“lawyers professional liability insurance policy.”130 That endorsement
provides that “[t]he Company shall reimburse the Named Insured up to the
amount stated in the Breach Mitigation Expense, Ransomware Attack and
Wire Fraud Limits of Liability Schedule as applicable to Ransomware Attack
for Loss . . . .”131 The policy defines a “loss” to include “[t]he Named
Insured’s payment of an extortion demand.”132 Some insurers appear to offer
overlapping coverage, providing for extortion payments in their cyber
policies and their kidnap and ransom policies.133 Coverage under all of these
policies is predominantly first-party.
As is the case with many types of property and casualty insurance,
cyber insurers do more than simply provide indemnity for loss. They also
offer significant expertise and assistance to reduce the insured’s cyber risks
before attacks happen and reduce their cyber losses after an attack. That is,
insurers offer services that are supposed to reduce the likelihood of a
successful ransomware attack, and they offer services after an attack occurs,
designed to minimize the costs of an attack if one occurs.134 The former are
sometimes referred to as “pre-breach services” and the latter as “post-breach
services.”135
Pre-breach services include access to password management
software (which makes it easy for employees to generate and deploy strong
passwords to fend off brute force attacks), precision geo-blocking or
130

MARKEL INS. CO., BREACH MITIGATION EXPENSE, RANSOMWARE ATTACK
WIRE FRAUD COVERAGE (2017) (on file with Journal).
131
Id. at 2.
132
Id. at 5.
133
See Suzanne Barlyn & Carolyn Cohn, Companies Use Kidnap Insurance to
Guard Against Ransomware Attacks, REUTERS (May 19, 2017, 9:54 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-attack-insurance/companies-use-kidnapinsurance-to-guard-against-ransomware-attacks-idUSKCN18F1LU.
Compare
TRAVELERS INDEM. CO., KIDNAP AND RANSOM COVERAGE 1 (2016), https://
www.travelers.com/iw-documents/apps-forms/kidnap-ransom/ker-16001.pdf
[hereinafter TRAVELERS KIDNAP AND RANSOM COVERAGE] (providing coverage for
kidnap extortion payments), with TRAVELERS INDEM. CO., CYBERRISK COVERAGE
4 (2019), https://www.travelers.com/iw-documents/apps-forms/cyberrisk/cyb16001.pdf [hereinafter TRAVELERS CYBERRISK COVERAGE] (providing coverage for
reasonable cyber ransom payouts).
134
Talesh, supra note 121, at 479–84.
135
See, e.g., Shauhin A. Talesh & Bryan Cunningham, The Technologization of
Insurance: An Empirical Analysis of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence’s Impact
on Cybersecurity and Privacy, 5 UTAH L. REV. 967, 1003 (2021).
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shunning (which restricts access to internet sites that are deemed dangerous),
and online or in-person cyber security training (designed to teach employees
the best practices for avoiding malware attacks and providing a function that
allows managers to view employees’ test results and completion
statistics).136 In theory, such pre-breach services reduce the risk of a cyberattack by focusing on the employees—who constitute the weakest link in
most organizations’ cyber security plans.137 As Shauhin Talesh has observed,
pre-breach services can also include comprehensive “cyber health checks,”
the goal of which is to “give organizations a 360 degree view of their people,
processes and technology, so they can reaffirm that reasonable practices are
in place, harden their data security, qualify for network liability and privacy
insurance, and bolster their defense posture in the event of class action
lawsuits.”138
Post-breach services offered by insurers also provide potential value
to insureds by minimizing the extent of the harm. These services are often
provided in the form of an “incident response team.”139 These teams consist
of groups of individuals who have expertise in a range of relevant subjects
and are employed either by the insurer or by a third-party provider who has
136
See id. at 1003–04. Version of these services can be found on the websites
of most insurers that sell cyber policies. See, e.g., Loss Mitigation for Cyber
Policyholders, CHUBB: CYBER SERVICES, https://www.chubb.com/us-en/businessinsurance/loss-mitigation-for-cyber-policyholders.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2022);
Cyber Loss Control Services, AM. INT’L GRP., INC., https://www.aig.com/
content/dam/aig/america-canada/us/documents/business/cyber/cyber-loss-controlservices-all.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Risk Management Tools & Resources,
BEAZLEY GRP., https://www.beazley.com/united_kingdom/cyber_and_tech/beazley
_breach_response/cyber_services/risk_management_tools_and_resources.html
(last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
137
See Frances Dewing, Employees Are the Weak Link in Your Business: Why
Cybersecurity Protection Starts with Them, FORBES (Apr. 9, 2019, 8:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2019/04/09/employees-are-the-weak-link-inyour-business-why-cybersecurity-protection-starts-with-them/.
138
Shauhin A. Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance: How
Insurance Companies Act as “Compliance Managers” for Businesses, 43 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 417, 429 (2018) (quoting NETDILIGENCE, CYBER RISK ASSESSMENTS
(2015)).
139
See id. at 432–33. See, e.g., CHUBB, CYBER SERVICES FOR INCIDENT
RESPONSE 1 (2020), https://www.chubb.com/content/dam/chubb-sites/chubbcom/ca-fr/claims/marketing-materials/documents/pdf/cyber-servbices-for-incidentresponse.pdf.
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a relationship with the insurer—and whom the insured is incentivized to use
through reduced premiums.140 The services provided by the cyber response
team can include forensics, crisis management, public relations, information
technology expertise, credit monitoring, and a “breach coach” who runs the
show.141 The breach coach is typically an outside lawyer recommended by
the insurer who has experience and expertise in handling a range of legal
issues that can arise in the context of a data breach (e.g., intellectual property,
privacy law, and national security law).142 As Talesh notes, “[the breach
coach] lawyers play a critical role in developing and managing the incident
response team that is formed when a data breach occurs.”143
In the context of ransomware insurance in particular, the cyber
insurer and its cyber response team play an especially critical role in
managing the post-breach risk. Someone on the side of the target
organization must negotiate with the criminal demanding payment, they
must decide whether to pay the ransom, and if a ransom is to be paid,
precisely how much that should be, in what form, and under what conditions.
While insurers generally leave that process to the insured, the breach coach
plays an essential role. Breach coaches oversee the overall response, serving
as “central coordinators when it comes to ransomware response,
coordinating with computer forensic experts who can determine the extent
of the attack, companies that can notify customers impacted by a breach, and
IT firms that can quickly provide staffing to fix issues.”144 What’s more, if
the company decides they do want to pay the ransom (or are at least open to
that possibility), the breach coach then brings in a separate ransomware
expert, one who has considerable experience negotiating with ransomware
attackers and verifying that ransom payments will actually result in unlocked
and unharmed files.145 These experts—who also are not employed by the
insurer but are part of the insurer’s ransomware response team—play a
unique and important role in the response. They can help negotiate for a
lower ransom, for example, by deploying specialized negotiation

140

Talesh, supra note 121, at 481.
Id. at 481–84.
142
Id. at 481–82.
143
Id. at 482.
144
Steven Melendez, When Hackers Kidnap Their Data, Companies are
Increasingly Using ‘Breach Coaches’ and Negotiators, FAST CO. (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90473369/when-ransomware-strikes-companiesare-increasingly-turning-to-breach-coaches.
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strategies.146 They can also use their own databases,147 built up over the
course of many ransomware negotiations, to determine, among other things,
whether a ransom demand is reasonable,148 whether an attacker is reliable
(i.e., whether the encryption keys will actually be provided upon payment),
and whether they tend to unlock the frozen data with minimal damage to the
files.149 All of this information is useful to an insured who is trying to
minimize their overall losses from ransomware attacks.

C. THE ROLE OF CYBER INSURERS IN RANSOMWARE NEGOTIATIONS
According to one source within the industry that we spoke to, while
the typical practice is for insurers not to get directly involved in the ransomnegotiation process, some insurers do.150 This includes acts such as
participating in phone calls between breach coach and client.151 Even in the
typical case, however, where the insurer is remaining “hands off,” the
presence of the insurance company—and its relationship with the insured
and the breach coach—will inevitably have some influence on the
negotiation process, at least indirectly. First, if an insured agrees to a ransom
demand that the insurer deems to be excessive, the insured runs the risk of
either having their premiums increased or losing coverage entirely. Second,
the breach coach also has an incentive not to alienate the insurer. Note that
in the event of a ransomware attack, cyber insurers typically offer their
insureds a panel of attorneys (or potential breach coaches) to choose from.152
Thus, the insurers clearly have a strong financial incentive to include
attorneys in their panel of preferred breach coaches who are able to keep the
146

Id.
Confidential Interviews with Attorneys, supra note 127.
148
It might seem odd to think of any ransom demand as being reasonable. All
such demands, in an important sense, are deeply unreasonable. By reasonable here
we mean something quite specific, which we discuss further below. See infra note
161 and accompanying text.
149
Melendez, supra note 144.
150
Confidential Interviews with Attorneys, supra note 127.
151
Id.
152
Talesh, supra note 121, at 482. This is not unlike the practice that liability
insurers have in the context of providing legal defense counsel to represent their
insureds against covered claims.
147
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insured’s—and the insurer’s—overall costs down, including the costs of
ransom payouts as well as the costs of covering the harm associated with
failed ransom negotiations. Therefore, while breach coaches (and the other
intermediaries they recommend to the insured to help deal with a
ransomware attack) formally represent the insured, and only the insured, they
have incentives to consider the interests of the insurer.153
The potential role of the cyber insurer in ransom negotiations raises
an obvious question. Who does the cyber insurance policy, if at all stated,
give ultimate control over the ransom-payment decision? The contractual
authority to make the final decisions varies from policy to policy. Some
policies leave the decision to the insured154—this is particularly the case
where ransomware is covered as a part of a broader kidnap and ransom
insurance.155 Other policies, including those offered by several major cyber
insurers, expressly give the authority to the insurer.156 Specifically, these
policies require the insurer’s prior written consent for any ransom paid.157
Some policies provide this consent requirement in the policy’s definition of
153

This is similar to the position of lawyers hired by insurers to defend insureds
in a tort action. In “single representation” states (e.g., Hawaii) the attorney has a
professional obligation only to the insured. See Finley v. Home Ins. Co., 975 P.2d
1145, 1152–53 (Haw. 1998); Pine Island Farmers Coop v. Erstad & Riemer, P.A.,
649 N.W.2d 444, 451–52 (Minn. 2002) (finding dual representation is only allowed
if there is no conflict of interest and that the insured provides an expressed consent
after being informed of the risks and advantages of dual representation, and that
there is no conflict of interest); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d
625, 632–34 (Tex. 1998). In “dual representation” states, retained counsel represents
both the interests of the insurer and the insured, owing a duty to both. See Nev.
Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 152 P.3d 737, 741–
42 (Nev. 2007).
154
See, e.g., TRAVELERS KIDNAP AND RANSOM COVERAGE, supra note 133, at
10.
155
See Barlyn & Cohn, supra note 133 (“American International Group Inc [],
Hiscox Ltd [] and the Travelers Companies Inc [] have been receiving ransomware
claims from some customers with K&R policies as ransomware attacks become
more common, the companies said.”).
156
See e.g., TRAVELERS CYBERRISK COVERAGE, supra note 133, at 4.
157
These policies stand in stark contrast to kidnap and ransom insurance
policies, where kidnap and ransom insurance policies give the final say on whether
to pay the ransom to the insured organization or family. See, e.g., TRAVELERS
KIDNAP AND RANSOM COVERAGE, supra note 133, at 10. We later discuss some
differences between kidnap and ransom coverage and ransomware coverage that
might help to explain this difference. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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what is a covered “loss.” For example, AIG’s CyberEdge Cyber Extortion
Insurance coverage defines a covered loss as “monies paid by an Insured
with the Insurer’s prior written consent to terminate or end a Security Threat
or Privacy Threat that would otherwise result in harm to an Insured.”158
Note also that, while the policy may require the insurer’s consent to
any ransom payments, the policy can also impose an obligation on the insurer
not to withhold consent unreasonably.159 Moreover, even if there were no
language in the policy expressly imposing a duty of reasonableness on the
insurer with respect to ransom-payment decisions, a court could well decide
that such a duty is implied in the consent provisions of a cyber insurance
policy, just as courts imply a duty of good faith into contracts (e.g., with
respect to insurers’ “duty to settle”).160
This combination of rights and responsibilities—where the insurer’s
consent is required but limits are placed on the insurer’s discretion to
withhold consent—makes sense from the perspective of maximizing the
joint welfare of the insured and insurer named in a particular cyber policy.
On the one hand, because the insurer is ultimately responsible for the loss
payment, and the amount of the loss payment is a function of the ransom
negotiations, the insurer reasonably will want some say in the negotiation
process. If the insurer had no such say—that is, if the insured had unfettered
See, e.g., AM. INT’L GRP., INC., supra note 129, at 115 (emphasis added).
Indeed, this is what AXA’s CyberRiskConnect policy does. X.L. AM., INC.,
supra note 13, at 10 (stating that insurer’s consent “not to be unreasonably withheld
. . . .”). Note here the use in the policy of the term “unreasonably” with respect to
the decision whether to pay a ransom, implying there are reasonable decisions to pay
a ransom and unreasonable ones.
160
This is especially true because of the potential conflict of interest that can be
created by giving unfettered power to the insurer to withhold consent to pay a
ransom. Some of the costs of a failed ransom negotiation may not be covered by
insurance (either because the expenses fall outside the policy limit or are excluded
for some reason), the insurer might externalize some of the costs of a failed
negotiation strategy—such as taking too hard a line on what they are willing to pay,
resulting in a breakdown of negotiations—to the insured. In the standard liability
insurance settlement context, this scenario is sometimes characterized as the insurer
gambling with the insured’s money. To address the problem in that context, the law
applies a duty of good faith and fair dealing, which requires insurers to take into
account its own interests and the interests of the insured in such negotiations. See
generally RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS. § 24 (AM. L. INST. 2019)
(describing the liability insurer’s duty to make reasonable settlement decisions).
158
159
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control over the ransom negotiation with assurance that any ransom payment
would be covered—there would be an incentive for the insured to make an
unreasonable ransom decisions (i.e., to accede to ransom demands that
might, from the perspective of minimizing overall payouts to the hacker, be
better to reject).161 This is a form of moral hazard. But there could also be
insurer-side moral hazard if the insurer were given unrestricted discretion to
veto any ransom demand that is made. In that situation, the insurer would
have an incentive to reject some ransom demands that reasonably ought to
be accepted—in the sense that accepting the ransom demand would
minimize overall losses associated with this ransom attack.162 This is why
the contract imposes a reasonableness limitation on the insurer’s ability to
withhold consent for ransom payments. It is also why, if the ransom
insurance policy contained no reasonableness limitation, the law would
almost certainly imply one as part of the insurer’s duty of good faith and fair
dealing.163
By “unreasonable ransom decisions” here, we mean decisions that will tend
not to maximize the joint well-being of the two parties to the contract. A reasonable
ransom decision, in this context, would be one that is made by a rational party who
will suffer all of the losses from a particular ransomware attack. The analogy to the
duty to settle context should be obvious. See RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS.
§24(2) (AM. L. INST. 2018) (“A reasonable settlement decision is one that would be
made by a reasonable insurer that bears the sole financial responsibility for the full
amount of the potential judgment.”). As we discuss further below, a ransom decision
that might be reasonable from the perspective of the insurer and insured in a
particular ransomware situation will not necessarily be socially optimal. See infra
Part IV.B.1.
162
This could happen if some of the costs of not paying the ransom are not
covered under the insurance policy. In that situation, if the insurer vetoes a ransom
demand, it could be because they are, in a sense, gambling with the insured’s money.
163
There are numerous examples of the law implying such a covenant. For
example, in almost all liability insurance policies, there is language requiring
insureds to get the insurer’s consent before settling a claim. 3 FRANKLIN D.
CORDELL, NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW § 20.04[2][a] (Jeffrey E. Thomas &
Francis J. Mootz, III eds., Library Ed., LEXIS, database updated May 2022).
Settlement without consent can result in loss of coverage. Id. By the same token,
unreasonable withholding of consent by the insurer is considered a breach of the
duty of good faith. Id. § 20.04[2][b]. Similarly, with liability insurance policies that
include coverage for defense costs, there are typically provisions conditioning
coverage on the insured’s not incurring any defense costs without the expressed
consent (usually the written consent) of the insurer. Id. § 20.04[1][a]. Here too,
courts have found that an insurer’s unreasonable refusal to grant such consent, even
161
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In sum, although some cyber insurance policies give insurers the
power to withhold consent to ransom payments, that power is limited both
in the contract itself and, presumably, by the duty of good faith and fair
dealing.164 According to one source we spoke with, however, insurers almost
never invoke this contractual authority, preferring instead to defer to the
preferences of the insured.165 This is not surprising for several reasons.
First, insurers may be worried about the possibility of a bad faith
claim. That is, if a ransom demand were made that an insured wanted the
insurer to pay, but the insurer refused or even delayed, the insurer would run
the risk of extra-contractual bad faith liability.166 Second, insurers have a
reputational interest in not being viewed as an obstacle to ransom payouts. It
is not uncommon for insurers to pay claims that, strictly speaking, they may
not be contractually required to pay, precisely because of this reputational
concern.167 There are obviously limits to this concern, as evidenced by the
many coverage disputes insurers do in fact litigate.168 Third, ransomware
insurers, to some extent, rely on the prudence of the breach coaches, who
both are experienced in these matters and are likely to have a better sense
than most insureds of when a hacker is willing to negotiate and when a
ransom demand is unreasonably high (as compared to the costs to the insured
of saying no and opting to go the restoration route). Breach coaches, because
of their expertise, have a fair amount of influence with the insureds and can
often steer them away from making ill-considered ransom-related decisions,
such as paying a ransom that could have been successfully negotiated down
or declining to accept a ransom demand that is the best offer the insured is
likely to get, which would be considerably less expensive than having to
restore the overall system. Also, as already mentioned, breach coaches may
in the absence of contractual language limiting the insurer’s discretion, may be
considered a breach of the insurer’s duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. §
20.04[1][c].
164
We say “presumably” because there is no court decision, as of now, applying
the duty of good faith and fair dealing to this context.
165
Confidential Interviews with Attorneys, supra note 127.
166
There is an analogy here to the liability insurer’s duty to make reasonable
settlement decisions on behalf of an insured against whom a tort claim has been
brought. See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS. § 24(1) (AM. L. INST.
2019) (describing the liability insurer’s duty to make reasonable settlement
decisions).
167
Confidential Interviews with Attorneys, supra note 127.
168
Id.
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have a long-term financial relationship with the insurer, which adds extra
incentive for them to prevent the insured from making a decision that would
increase the insured’s overall costs.169 Finally, one reason insurers seem
never to invoke their contractual veto over ransom decisions is that it is often
the insureds who are the ones vetoing any ransom payment.170 Put simply,
the victims of these attacks often react with outrage and anger, and these
emotions can translate into an unwillingness to “cave” to the hacker’s
demands, even when it might be rational for them to do so, given the cost of
the ransom and relative to the cost of restoring the system.171
RANSOMWARE INSURANCE AND THE “EXTORTION
ECONOMY”: COMPLICATING THE PICTURE

III.

The preceding Part explained the history and the structure of
ransomware insurance as a social practice. In this Part we start by reviewing
what we call the “profitability complaint,” which has been lodged against
ransomware insurance coverage for ransom payments. Specifically, the
complaint comes from the idea that the presence of insurance makes the
business of ransomware more profitable for criminals. Next, we explain why,
notwithstanding this complaint, there is at least a theoretical argument that
the presence of ransomware insurance might be a social good—or, put in
economic terms, welfare enhancing. Nevertheless, we conclude this Part
with an argument that there are market failures that may be inhibiting the
ability of ransomware insurance to enhance social welfare, giving rise to the
case for some form of government action.

169

In fact, we have been told that some cyber policies do not contain consentto-pay-ransom provisions and that, with respect to those policies, insurers depend
even more on the breach coach “to do the right thing” (i.e., to pay the ransom only
if it is reasonable). Id. One lawyer employed at an “off-panel” firm commented that
breach counsel takes some risk by doing this—opening themselves to malpractice
suit alleging that the coach failed to advise paying a reasonable ransom, advised
paying an unreasonable ransom and causing a subsequent loss of coverage. Id.
170
Id.
171
This assessment was confirmed in a confidential interview with one highranking official in an organization that was victimized by a ransomware attack. In
that case, the insured decided not to pay the ransom, even though the insurer was
willing to pay it and even though forcing the insurer to cover the costs of restoring
the system resulted in their premiums doubling the next year.
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THE PROFITABILITY COMPLAINT

The following is the common-sense intuition that underlies much of
the critical reporting on ransomware insurance: the availability of insurance
for ransom payments increases the profitability of ransomware attacks and
therefore the frequency of such attacks and the amount of ransom demand.172
This view is based on the notion that entities with ransomware insurance
have more money available to pay a potential ransom than entities that do
not have such insurance (and that are equal in other respects). The more
money a potential cyber target has to spend on a ransom payment, the greater
their willingness to pay, and thus the more profitable a ransomware attack
will be.173 The more profitable such attacks are, the more likely those attacks
become—assuming the attackers are aware of the presence of ransomware
coverage.174 Indeed, there are media reports suggesting a trend in the
172

Dudley, supra note 10.
Id.
174
Whether hackers can determine which targets have ransomware coverage
remains something of an open question. Organizations are not required to disclose
this information to public sources. However, hackers may be able to figure out who
has insurance from non-public sources. The most obvious way to do this would be
to hack the insurers themselves and get their list of insureds. There is little doubt that
hackers are interested in doing just that. See, e.g., Dmitry Smilyanets, ‘I Scrounged
Through the Trash Heaps… Now I’m a Millionaire:’ An Interview With REvil’s
Unknown, THE RECORD (Mar. 16, 2021), https://therecord.media/i-scroungedthrough-the-trash-heaps-now-im-a-millionaire-an-interview-with-revils-unknown/
(quoting a representative from ransomware gang REvil that they try to “hack the
insurers first—to get their customer base and work in a targeted way from there. And
after you go through the list, then hit the insurer themselves.”). And there have
already been a number of hacks of large cyber insurers. See, e.g., Brittany Chang,
One of the Biggest US Insurance Companies Reportedly Paid Hackers $40 Million
Ransom After a Cyberattack, BUS. INSIDER (May 22, 2021, 11:47 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/cna-financial-hackers-40-million-ransomcyberattack-2021-5 (discussing hacking of CNA). At this point, however, it remains
unclear whether the recent hacking of insurance companies has resulted in the
criminals getting access to the insurers’ list of insureds. Alicia Hope, Cyber
Insurance Firm Suffers Sophisticated Ransomware Cyber Attack; Data Obtained
May Help Hackers Better Target Firm’s Customers, CPO MAG. (Apr. 5, 2021),
https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/cyber-insurance-firm-sufferssophisticated-ransomware-cyber-attack-data-obtained-may-help-hackers-bettertarget-firms-customers/. What’s more, even if hackers succeed in getting the list,
173
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direction of ransomware insurers advising their insureds to pay the ransom,
as the “least expensive resolution with the lowest amount of business
interruption.”175
On this view, if the government could raise the costs of paying a
ransom—for example, by creating a risk of civil and criminal sanctions for
either the insurer or the victims, or both—the amount that the criminals can
expect to be paid will go down, and the number of overall attacks should, in
turn, decrease.176 This would be consistent with theoretical predictions that
have been made with respect to bans on kidnap-and-ransom insurance.177 On
determining whether the policyholders are covered for ransomware attacks would
be a daunting task, as the hackers would have to read reams of pages of densely and
obscurely worded insurance policy language. As one internet security expert put it:
[I]t’s premature to talk about a major spike in attacks targeting
insurance firms with a purpose to steal lists of customers who have
cybersecurity insurance . . . .
....
Moreover, cybercriminals will unlikely go through lengthy cyber
insurance contracts to ferret out which specific incidents are
covered and what are the numerous exclusions.
Id. (quoting Ilia Kolochenko, CEO, Founder, and Chief Architect of ImmuniWeb).
175
See, e.g., Scott Ikeda, Ransomware Attacks are Causing Cyber Insurance
Rates to Go Through the Roof; Premiums Up as Much as 25 Percent, CPO MAG.
(Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/ransomwareattacks-are-causing-cyber-insurance-rates-to-go-through-the-roof-premiums-up-asmuch-as-25-percent/.
176
This result assumes that the ransomware “market” is characterized by an
upward sloping supply curve, so that the higher the expected ransom payment the
greater will be the number of ransomware attacks. Although we are aware of no
formal models of the ransomware market, this is how kidnap-and-ransom markets
generally are modeled. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 27, at 28–31
(summarizing the literature). Several countries have banned ransom payments in
response to organized crime, particularly Colombia and Italy. Id. at 29–31. These
bans, however, have been in place since 1993 and 1991, respectively, in response to
kidnappings in these countries. Id.
177
Game theoretic supports for the presence of ransom insurance increases the
willingness to pay of the victims’ families. Alexander Fink & Mark Pingle, Kidnap
Insurance and Its Impact on Kidnapping Outcomes, 160 PUB. CHOICE 481, 490
(2014) (finding that “the existence of a competitive insurance market increases the
maximum ransom demand a family is willing to pay.”). Parchomovsky and
Siegelman note that there is evidence consistent with, though not proof of, the view
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the basis of such arguments, some critics of ransomware insurance are so
convinced of the harmful effects of ransomware insurance that they have
proposed banning it for ransom payments.178 Others have not gone so far as
to call for banning such coverage, though the logical conclusion of their
arguments would seem to support a ban.179 We will have more to say below
about calls for a comprehensive ban.180 But first, consider the argument that,
notwithstanding the profitability complaint, the presence of ransomware
insurance might at least in theory be welfare enhancing.
E. THE POTENTIAL OF RANSOMWARE INSURANCE
There is an argument, which has been largely missed in the
discussions of ransomware insurance, that the existence of a thriving market
in this type of coverage could actually increase social welfare, even without
any government intervention in the form of bans or subsidies or direct
regulation other than the sorts of regulation that apply to all forms of
insurance. Let’s begin with the risk-spreading benefits of ransomware
that banning K&R insurance would reduce kidnappings. Parchomovsky &
Siegelman, supra note 27, at 31. For example, they note that, in the period following
Italy’s imposition of severe restrictions on ransom payments, there was a substantial
drop in kidnappings. Id. at 30. They also point out, however, that that drop in
kidnappings could have been the result of “a drop in the rate at which kidnaps were
reported to the police.” Id. at 30 n.111. In conclusion, they summarize the evidence
with respect to kidnap-and-ransom insurance as follows: “[t]he bottom line is that
while it’s difficult to prove that kidnap insurance increases kidnappings, the limited
available evidence is entirely consistent with that possibility, and some theoretical
models predict it.” Id. at 31.
178
Perhaps the most well-known example of this involves Ciaran Martin, the
former head of the National Cyber Security Centre. See Sabbagh, supra note 23;
Gareth Corfield, How Do We Stamp Out the Ransomware Business Model? Ban
Insurance
Payouts for One, Says Ex-GCHQ Director, REGISTER (Apr. 9, 2021,
10:02
AM),
https://www.theregister.com/2021/04/09/ban_cyber_insurance_
payouts/; Scroxton, supra note 15.
179
The ProPublica story would be an example of this. Dudley, supra note 10.
A research paper released by the Royal United Services Institute makes much the
same argument—that cyber insurance policies are encouraging cybercriminals.
JAMIE MACCOLL, JASON R. C. NURSE & JAMES SULLIVAN, CYBER INSURANCE AND
THE CYBER SECURITY CHALLENGE 38, (2021), https://static.rusi.org/247-op-cyberinsurance-v2.pdf.
180
See infra Part IV.B.3.
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insurance. Even if it is true that the presence of ransomware insurance
increases the likelihood of an attack and the amount of the payouts, there are
potential welfare gains from taking the risks of cyber-attack experienced by
individual organizations and spread those risk over much larger pool of
insureds through an insurance contract. What’s more, it is at least possible
that the gains from risk distribution can more than offset any increase in
losses due to moral hazard. This is a standard move in the economic analysis
of insurance. Indeed, even the economists who model ransom situations
conclude that as a result of the risk-spreading benefits of kidnapping
insurance, the efficient outcome would be at least partial coverage despite
the possible moral hazard effect.181
In addition to the obvious risk-spreading benefits of ransomware
insurance, there is also the possibility that the presence of insurance could
actually reduce rather than increase the likelihood of an attack or the severity
of its consequences.182 How is this possible? The argument builds on the
observation, first, that private insurance companies have a financial incentive
to find ways to lower their insureds insured losses. For example, if an insurer
can, by encouraging simple risk-reducing behavior on the part of their
customers, lower the price they pay for insurance, that insurer can compete
those customers away from, or prevent them from being competed away by,
other insurers. 183 Also, once an insurer has collected a premium for a given
policy period, any changes in behavior on the part of the insured that reduce
the insured risk for that period will redound to the financial benefit of the
insurer.184
181

See, e.g., Fink & Pingle, supra note 177, at 498.
Parchomovsky and Siegelman, in their discussion of the third-party moral
hazard effects of K&R insurance, discuss the possibility of insurers helping their
insureds to reduce their vulnerability to kidnapping. Parchomovsky & Siegelman,
supra note 27, at 45–49 (discussing loss control and monitoring by insurers).
183
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 37, at 203–05 (discussing insurers’
financial incentives to find ways to reduce their insureds risks). Below, however, we
discuss how particular market failures may be muting those incentives. See infra
notes 237–42 and accompanying text.
184
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 37, at 203–05. We are, of course, not saying
that insurance companies’ interest in maximizing profit is coextensive with society’s
interest in reducing ransomware attacks. If all insurable risks were somehow
miraculously eliminated, society would be better off, but insurers would be out of
business. The same sort of point could be about the medical profession (if all
diseases were magically eliminated) or law enforcement (if all crime was
eliminated). The profit interests of insurers and the interests of society diverge at
182
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In addition to having some incentive to reduce their insured’s risks,
insurance companies also have tools with which to do so. Some of those
“regulatory” tools operate ex ante—that is, the insurers take steps before the
loss event happens that reduce the probability or magnitude of the loss—and
some of the tools operate ex post—that is, the insurers take steps after the
loss event happens to minimize the size of the loss.185 As for the ex ante tools,
recall the earlier discussion of all the pre-breach services the cyber insurers
are offering their insureds.186 To the extent insurers, through premium
discounts or otherwise, can incentivize organizations to adopt essential prebreach cyber security best practices (i.e., investing in state-of-the-art backup
systems, endpoint and anti-virus protection, and security awareness training
for all employees),187 they may actually reduce, rather than increase, the
overall threat of ransomware attacks.
As for ex post tools, recall the earlier discussion of the critical role
played by insurers’ post-breaching consulting, as they bring in breach
coaches, forensic experts, public relations experts, privacy law experts, and
ransom negotiators to assist with all aspects of the cyber breach.188 With
some point. Specifically, if the risk of ransomware attack were to get sufficiently
low, there is a sense in which it may no longer be in the profit-maximizing interest
of the insurance industry to look for ways to reduce the risk further. However, it also
seems likely that, for risks that are reasonably large and unlikely to be reduced to
anything close to zero any time soon—that is to say, for most of the risks that can
profitably be insured by a private insurance company—there is a wide range of
overlap between the insurers’ interests, the insureds’ interest, and society’s interests.
This certainly seems true for the rapidly growing risk of ransomware attacks.
185
For a general discussion of how private insurance companies engage in what
amounts to ex ante and ex post regulation that is similar, though not identical
government regulation, see id. at 205–16. Insurers resist the notion that their efforts
at helping insureds engage in risk- or loss-mitigation represents a form of regulation,
perhaps because, if they become too involved, they (the insurers) may be held
responsible beyond the coverage they have agreed to in their insurance policies. See
Kyle D. Logue, Encouraging Insurers to Regulate: The Role (If Any) for Tort Law,
5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1355, 1357–58 (2015).
186
See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.
187
Corporate Ransomware Response & Protection Best Practices, COVEWARE
(Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.coveware.com/blog/2018/12/19/definitive-guide-tocorporate-ransomware-response-amp-protection-best-practices. Some experts
believe that practicing the backups adds security. Confidential Interviews with
Attorneys, supra note 127.
188
See supra notes 139–49 and accompanying text.
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respect to this type of intervention, Talesh concluded that “[p]erhaps the
biggest intervention the insurance field makes is the array of risk
management services it offers to shape the way that organizations respond
in the event of an actual data breach.”189 The active role played by insurers
in ex post loss mitigation is unsurprising given the economic incentives faced
by insurers. An insurer who is contractually obligated to reimburse any
ransom payouts, as well as the cost of any failed ransom negotiations (such
as the cost of restoring the insured’s locked data, as well as the insured’s
business interruption losses and liability claims) will have a contractual
incentive to help their insureds respond in a way that minimizes the insureds’
covered costs. Further, the insurer, through the operation of insurance law
(specifically, the duty of good faith and fair dealing) as well as competitive
insurance markets (and the desire to maintain a good commercial reputation),
will have an incentive to manage the ransomware attack in a way that takes
account of the insureds’ uncovered costs as well.190 Thus, taking all of these
incentives into account, the insurer should be incentivized to pay the
ransom—or to encourage the insured to pay the ransom—when that payment
will be less than the expected costs to the parties of not paying the ransom.
At the same time, the insurer will have an incentive to refuse to give consent
to a ransom (where the contract gives the insurer that authority), or an
incentive to encourage the insured to refuse to pay the ransom (where the
contract gives the insured the final say), when doing so minimizes the
parties’ overall costs.
Besides these ex ante and ex post “regulatory” tools that insurers can,
and have some incentive, to deploy in order to reduce ransomware risks,
there is another way in which the presence of cyber insurance can reduce the
likelihood of a ransomware attack. It has to do with the risk-distribution
effect of the coverage for the costs of ransomware attacks other than the
payment of the ransom itself. To the extent that cyber policies provide firstparty and third-party coverage against the business interruption costs of
having one’s computer system locked for an extended period of time,
repairing and restoring that system, and covering liabilities arising out of
such costs, the expected cost to an insured organization of a potential
ransomware attack is lessened. That is to say, while having coverage for the
ransom payment increases the pot of money available to pay the ransom—
and at least potentially increase the profitability to criminals of engaging in
ransomware attacks—the coverage for the costs of ransomware attacks
189

Talesh, supra note 138, at 432.
See supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text for previous discussion of
the duty to make reasonable ransom negotiation decisions.
190
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increases the pot of money for the insured not to pay the ransom, producing
the opposite effect on the profitability of the criminal enterprise.
In sum, given the risk-spreading and potential risk-reducing benefits
associated with the presence of ransomware coverage, one might be tempted
to conclude—contrary to the tone of the recent reporting—that the cyber
insurance market should be left alone to work its magic. That conclusion
should be resisted, however, because of the presence of (at least) two market
failures, two externalities to be precise: the single-year-policy externality and
the ransom externality.
The vast majority of property and casualty insurance policies,
including cyber policies, are written on a one-year basis. As a result, insurers,
when pricing the risk for a single year, will have a tendency to undervalue
losses that their insureds might incur that are likely to fall outside of that oneyear coverage period since the insurer will not be responsible for covering
those costs. We say “undervalue” rather than totally ignore because of the
probabilistic nature of insured losses. That is, whether a given loss to an
insured will occur outside or inside the coverage period will be, to some
extent, stochastic; and, to the extent that is the case, the insurer would have
some (albeit probabilistically discounted) incentive to take those losses into
account. Still, some portion of an insured’s future losses will be expected to
fall outside of the insured period. And here is the problem with those losses
in particular: there may be ex ante investments in enhanced safety by the
insured that would reduce or eliminate the risk of such losses that the insurer
is aware of (because of its relative expertise in such matters compared with
some insureds) but that the insurer will not be induced to fully incentivize
(through premium discounts, say) because the cost of such risk-reduction
investments need to be amortized over several years.
This point can be illustrated with a simple example. Assume that an
insured faces a risk of loss that will with certainty (if it happens at all) happen
within the period of the single-year-policy issued by the insurer. Assume
further (a) that this risk has an ex ante expected cost of $100; (b) is fully
covered under the policy; but (c) can be eliminated with a pre-loss
investment by the insured of $70. The insurer in such a scenario would have
an incentive to encourage the insured to make the $70 risk-reducing
investment by offering the insured a premium discount of somewhere
between $70 and $100. This is because the insurer would get the full $100
expected benefit of the investment. However, here is the problem: if we
changed the hypothetical so that the insured faced a risk of loss that still had
an expected cost of $100 but that had an equal probability of happening in
any year over the next 5 years, the insurer would not have an incentive to
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offer the necessary discount. This is because some of the benefit of the
insured’s investment—and of the insurer’s premium discount—would be
externalized to future years, when the insurer might not be covering the risk.
Indeed, an insurer in this situation, were they to provide a large up-front
premium discount to encourage such an investment in long-term enhanced
safety, would find themselves at a pricing disadvantage compared with
competing insurers in future years, as those firms would not have incurred
the cost of providing what amounts to a subsidy to the insured. It is this very
possibility—of not being able to recover the cost of investments that produce
safety benefits beyond the end of the policy period—that discourages the
insurer from offering such premium discounts in the first instance.191
The second obstacle to the “leave the ransomware insurance market
alone” argument is what Anja Shortland calls the “ransom externality.”192
While the insurer and insured enjoy all or at least most of the benefits of
paying the ransom demand—that is, the benefits of receiving the decryption
key from the hacker—they bear only the out-of-pocket costs of doing so.
That is, they will generally ignore the cost to society of increasing the
incentive for future ransomware attacks. In other words, to use
Parchomovsky and Siegelman’s terminology, they will ignore the third-party
moral hazard effect.193 This externality can affect insurers’ and insureds’
incentives in a number of ways. Most obviously, at the ex post stage, once
the attack has occurred and the ransom demand has been received, the insurer
and insured may be willing to pay ransom payments that are efficient or
191

A similar externality arises because of the inability of insurers to get
intellectual property protection for their investments in risk detection, mitigation,
and pricing technologies. See, e.g., Joe Van Acker, Fed. Circ. Upholds PTAB’s
Invalidation of Progressive’s IP, LAW360 (Aug. 24, 2015, 3:27 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/694435/fed-circ-upholds-ptab-s-invalidation-ofprogressive-s-ip. This is not a problem that is peculiar to the cyber insurance market.
Most forms of property and casualty insurance are sold on an annual basis, which
means this externality has the potential to affect insurers’ incentives with respect to
many different types of risks. Scholars have long observed, for example, that
because homeowners’ insurance policies are sold on an annual basis, an externality
arises. HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER, ERWANN O. MICHEL-KERJAN, NEIL A. DOHERTY,
MARTIN F. GRACE, ROBERT W. KLEIN & MARK V. PAULY, AT WAR WITH THE
WEATHER: MANAGING LARGE-SCALE RISKS IN A NEW ERA OF CATASTROPHES 361–
65 (Carol Heller ed., Wharton Risk Management & Decisions Processes Center ed.
2008).
192
SHORTLAND, supra note 11, at 171.
193
See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 27, at 4.
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joint-wealth maximizing from their perspective but are inefficient from the
broader societal perspective.
To see this point, consider another fanciful but illustrative example.
Imagine that all ransomware attacks were covered fully by insurance, and
that all such insurance were provided (and were expected to be provided for
the foreseeable future) by a single giant cyber insurance company. In that
case whenever there was a ransomware attack, the insurer’s incentive on
whether to pay the ransom and how much to pay would be roughly
coextensive with society’s interests. Since the insurer would bear all of the
costs and benefits of the decision to pay the ransom or not, the insurer’s
decisions whether to pay the ransom or not will be closer to the social
optimum than would be the case if some of those costs are externalized.194
Thus, if paying any given ransom increased the expected cost to all possible
future victims of ransomware attacks (because of the perceived increase in
the profitability of such attacks) by more than the expected cost of refusing
to pay the ransom (the cost of rebuilding the insured’s network and covering
business interruption costs in the meantime), then the insurer would be likely
to reject the ransom. If the reverse were true, it would be likely to pay the
ransom. But once we take account of the fact that every individual insurer
bears only a (presumably) very small fraction of the costs resulting from the
increased demand for ransomware attacks produced by their decision to pay
a given ransom, they will tend to pay ransoms more often (and to pay larger
amounts in ransom) than is socially cost justified.195 That is the ransom
externality at the ex post or post-breach stage of the ransomware attack.
There can also be effects at the ex ante or pre-breach stage. For example, if
the insurer and insured know that they can always pay the ransomware
hackers’ demanded price—while externalizing most of the resulting third-

194

The incentives of insurance companies, of course, will never be coextensive
with what maximizes overall social welfare. This can be seen most clearly by
recognizing that insurers would be put out of business entirely as underwriters of
risk if the risks that they insure were eliminated, even if eliminating such risk would
be social welfare maximizing.
195
This is also sometimes referred to as a problem of “dynamic inconsistency,”
which means that it might be rationale to make one decision at one point in time
(i.e., refuse to pay ransoms generally to discourage ransomware attacks), but then it
becomes rational to do the opposite at a different point in time (i.e., once one is the
victim of a ransomware attack, it becomes individually though not socially rational
to pay the ransom). Parachomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 27, at 34.
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party moral hazard costs of that decision—their incentive to invest in ex ante
prevention would also be undermined.
Is there any evidence that the single-year-policy and the ransom
externalities are currently causing insurers to underinvest in ex ante risk or
ex post loss reduction efforts? No direct evidence exists of this connection,
so far as we are aware. There is, however, recent evidence that insurance
companies in the cyber insurance markets are doing less ex ante risk
regulation than one might have expected. According to a recent empirical
study conducted by Shauhin Talesh and Bryan Cunningham, which included
interviews of some sixty people in the cyber insurance field, most insurers
are reluctant to require their insureds to adopt pre-breach risk-mitigating best
practices.196 They found, for example, that while insurers are generally
making use of big data, predictive analytics, and AI to better assess the risks
of cyber insureds, most insurers seem to be unwilling to require that their
insureds make use of the insurer’s pre-breach services in order to get
premium discounts or to qualify for coverage at all.197 Instead, most insurers
are merely offering those pre-breach services as options. What’s more,
Talesh and Cunningham found that the vast majority of insureds are, in fact,
declining those services.198 As a result, they conclude that “cyber insurers
196

Talesh & Cunningham, supra note 135, at 1003–04, 1014.
Id.
198
Id. at 1015 (finding that “fewer than 10 percent of insureds that purchase
cyber insurance actually use the vast array of pre-breach services insurers offer that
would potentially reduce the insured’s potential risk . . . .”). These findings are
somewhat in tension with Talesh’s earlier article on the subject, published in 2017,
where he concluded:
197

These risk prevention tools and security ratings play an
important regulatory role over organizations. First, the scans and
health checks are sometimes used as a precondition for
determining whether a potential company is eligible for cyber
insurance. Organizations interested in insurance protection,
therefore, are often interested in becoming more cyber secure.
Second, the better a company scores on its health check, the
greater the likelihood the insurance company will lower its
premiums.
Talesh, supra note 138, at 429. In his defense, Talesh in that paper acknowledges in
a footnote that, because cyber insurance is not yet a mature insurance market,
insurers do not have the “refined premium setting standards” that they have for other
lines of coverage. Id. n.13. But based on his field research at the time, “the more
cyber secure organizations are with good preventative tools in place, the more likely
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role as quasi-regulators is largely ineffective—so far.”199 They attribute the
insurer’s reluctance to insist that their insureds engage in cyber security best
practices to the “soft market” in property and casualty insurance and the
threat that the insured will simply switch to another insurer, as well as to the
insurers’ insistence on continuing to use some traditional underwriting
practices, such as focusing on past behavior and limiting the underwriting
(and risk-assessment) process to once a year, neither of which responds to
the “constantly evolving” nature of cyber risk.200
organizations would be issued insurance and receive a favorable pricing
arrangement.” Id.
199
Talesh & Cunningham, supra note 135, at 1015. They also conclude that
most cyber insurers, in doing pre-breach risk assessments, although they are relying
on big data, predictive analytics, and even AI, are using unreliable databases and,
worse, are using those data misleadingly to encourage insureds to purchase higher
policy limits rather than to encourage insureds’ to engage in risk reduction. Id. at
1007–11. These are both potentially serious problems that may warrant regulatory
intervention, although, as Talesh and Cunningham point out, the regulators will
often find themselves using the same imperfect databases in making their regulatory
decisions. Id. at 1017–19. Talesh and Cunningham also lament the fact that insurers
do not seem to check the veracity of statements being made on insurance
applications, tending instead to rely on doing so only for those subset of cases where
a claim is filed. Id. at 995, 1016–17. Such ex-post underwriting, however, at least in
cases involving relatively sophisticated parties, may not be problematic, but could
be seen as another form of cost-saving ex post regulation. See Ben-Shahar & Logue,
supra note 37, at 215–16.
200
Talesh & Cunningham, supra note 135, at 1015–17. Kenneth Abraham and
Daniel Schwarcz consider this issue as well. They suggest that the reluctance of
insurers to engage in a greater degree of ex ante regulation stems from what they
call the “cyber insurance gap,” the fact that “cyber insurers typically insist on setting
policy limits that are well below policyholders’ economic exposures to cyber risk.”
Kenneth S. Abraham & Daniel Schwarcz, Courting Disaster: The Underappreciated
Risk of a Cyber Insurance Catastrophe, 27 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 54 (2021). Because of
this gap in cyber coverage, they argue:
It is difficult for cyber insurers to insist on meaningful changes to
policyholders’ cybersecurity precautions if they are only covering
a small percentage of the risks that may flow from a cyberattack
to that firm. Relatively low coverage limits also make it harder for
cyber insurers to insist that firms collect their own data regarding
cyber exposure as part of the underwriting process. Additionally,
the relatively small amount of capital that insurers have devoted
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Interestingly, Talesh and Cunningham are not overall pessimistic
about the role of cyber insurers as ex ante risk regulators. Rather, they
conclude that insurers may serve a “meaningful” role if they follow these
recommendations:
(1) engage in continuous evaluation and underwriting
throughout the life of cyber insurance policies, (2) make
insurance premium pricing contingent on reliable evidence
of good cybersecurity practices (i.e., reward good behavior
with reduced premiums), (3) when necessary, require
prospective insureds to make changes to improve their
cybersecurity posture as a prerequisite to issuing insurance,
and (4) engage in dynamic risk management and loss control
throughout the policy period to reduce insureds’ risk of
loss.201
Thus, insurers must not only add real carrots and sticks to their ex ante
regulation—in the form of substantial premium discounts and compliance
mandates, respectively—but also engage in such regulation continuously,
making adjustments to their premium-discount offers and risk-reduction
mandates as the AI-infused analysis of the constantly changing data, and
constantly changing cyber-risk landscape evolve over time. In support of this
relatively hopeful assessment, Talesh and Cunningham report that at least
some relatively new insurance companies are charting a path very much in
line with their recommendations and “with modest success.”202
to cyber insurance means that collective insurance industry
investment in understanding, protecting against, and informing
others about cybersecurity is correspondingly limited.
Id. at 56–57 (footnotes omitted). In other words, until cyber insurers have more skin
in the game (i.e., offer higher policy limits), they will lack the incentive to encourage
better cyber hygiene on the part of their insureds. Abraham and Schwarcz suggest a
number of possible ways in which the cyber insurance gap might be closed,
including the introduction of a federal backstop. Id. at 57–66. See infra Part IV.B.3
for our discussion of a similar federal backstop idea.
201
Talesh & Cunningham, supra note 135, at 1020.
202
Id. at 1020–21. Specifically, they conclude that, if insurers fully embrace the
promise of new technology (including big data and AI), they can, in theory, “help
increase organizations’ cybersecurity and insurer’s ability to play a positive
regulatory role.” Id. at 1020. The companies that are cited as exemplars of the newer,
more modern, more risk-reducing approach to insuring cyber-related risk are At-Bay
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A POSSIBLE WAY FORWARD: OF LIMITED BANS (AND
MANDATES)

Let us summarize where we are. Ransomware attacks present an
enormous social problem. Some commentators have expressed concern that
the existence of insurance for ransomware attacks makes the problem worse
by providing a pot of money that makes the ransomware business, from an
expected value perspective, more profitable for criminals than it would
otherwise be.203 In response we have made a series of observations. On the
one hand, it is at least possible that the presence of insurance produces
overall welfare gains, either as a result of risk distribution (through the
shifting of the risk of attacks from relatively risk-averse insureds to relatively
risk-neutral insurers) and risk minimization (through the provision of expert
pre-breach and post-breach cyber services by insurance companies, who
have a stake in seeing those risks get reduced). On the other hand, there
remain reasons to be worried. The single-year-policy externality and the
ransom externality (or third-party moral hazard problem) are serious
concerns, and they threaten to undermine insurers’ incentives to engage in
an efficient level of pre-breach and post-breach risk minimization. Indeed,
there is some suggestive, albeit far from conclusive, evidence that these
concerns may currently be inhibiting cyber insurers’ incentives to regulate
risk, as revealed in Talesh and Cunningham’s work discussed above.204
These observations lead to the next set of questions. First, might
there be a private ordering or Coasian solution to these problems—a way in
which the market itself could internalize these externalities? Second, if the
answer to that question is no, what government regulatory intervention might
be worth considering and what the costs and benefits of such government
and Coalition, Inc. Id. at 1020. As one example of At-Bay’s risk-reducing
innovations, they constantly monitor their insureds’ remote desktop protocol (RDP)
ports, which were the source of twenty-five percent of ransomware losses in 2018
and 2019. Id. at 1024. If the insured has not closed all of its RDP ports, At-Bay
apparently suspends their coverage. Id. This sort of continuous monitoring and
continuously enforced cyber security protocols represent the ex ante regulatory
potential of cyber insurers.
203
See supra Part III.A.
204
See supra notes 196–202 and accompanying text.
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intervention might be? Although answering those questions fully is beyond
the scope of this (or any single) Article, this Part begins that discussion.
A.

RESPONDING TO THE SINGLE-YEAR-POLICY EXTERNALITY

A solution to the single-year-policy externality is easy enough to
describe: property and casualty insurers just need to start selling multi-year
insurance policies, including (for current purposes) cyber policies. The more
years that are covered under a given policy, the smaller the potential
externality, all else equal.205 For this to happen organically, without
government involvement, we have to imagine a scenario in which it becomes
profit-maximizing for property and casualty insurance companies to offer
multi-year insurance policies. This is not inconceivable. Scholars have
developed plausible models of insurance markets in which both single-year
and multi-year policies could emerge.206 Indeed, some insurers sell multiyear policies for some types of coverage, including management liability,
financial institution bond insurance and, in some countries, homeowners
insurance.207 These markets emerge, in part, because of the perceived
benefits to policyholders of locking in premiums and avoiding the hassle of
going through a policy renewal.208 To the extent such policies already are in
use, they ameliorate the single-year-policy externality.209

205

If the increase in number of years of coverage were accompanied by lower
policy limits, then the externality would re-emerge in a different form.
206
See, e.g., Paul R. Kleindorfer, Howard Kunreuther & Chieh Ou-Yang,
Single-Year and Multi-Year Insurance Policies in a Competitive Market, 45 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY 51 (2012).
207
See, e.g., JOE CATALANO, COMMUNITY BANKS: THE RETURN OF THE MULTIYEAR INSURANCE POLICY 1 (2016), https://www.amwins.com/docs/default-source/
insights/client-advisory_community-banks-the-return-of-the-multi-year-policy_716.pdf?sfvrsn=1333ec5f_0 (describing re-emergence of multi-year liability policies
after market recovery from 2008 financial crisis); Fiona Reddan, Multi-Year
Insurance Deals — Do They Make Sense?, IRISH TIMES (Aug. 2, 2016, 6:00 PM),
https://www.irishtimes.com/business/personal-finance/multi-year-insurance-dealsdo-they-make-sense-1.2736307 (describing Irish market for multi-year homeowners
policies).
208
Kleindorfer, Kunreuther & Ou-Yang, supra note 206, at 52.
209
Scholars have long touted the potential benefit of “long-term homeowners’
insurance” as a way of forcing insurers to take into account the fluctuating nature of
catastrophic losses over time. See, e.g., KUNREUTHER, MICHEL-KERJAN, DOHERTY,
GRACE, KLEIN & PAULY, supra note 191, at 367–71. Though the idea was not offered
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The market for multi-year property and casualty insurance generally,
and in the cyber market in particular, however, has not taken off on its own.
The vast majority of policies are still sold on a single-year basis.210 And
reasons for that are understandable. First, if a risk being insured is highly
volatile from one year to the next (as cyber risk is), making pricing even a
single-year-policy difficult, then pricing a multi-year policy for that risk
would be even more difficult. As a result, an insurer offering multi-year
cyber policies would need to charge a serious mark-up over its single-year
premiums to cover this uncertainty; or the insurer would have to maintain a
very large capital base to cover any pricing errors; or they would do both.211
This will generally limit the demand for multi-year contracts, at least in the
primary retail insurance market.212 And the presence of the single-year
externality only makes this problem worse. That is, the presence of the
externality will push up prices for long-term insurance even more, further
depressing demand for such coverage.
What role might government play, then, in encouraging or fostering
the purchase of multi-year cyber policies? The federal government could
encourage property and casualty insurers to offer cyber coverage for policy
periods longer than one year by agreeing to provide federally subsidized
reinsurance for such coverage or through other, more direct subsidies. More
drastically, insurers could be required to offer such policies as an option,
with subsidies designed to make the coverage more affordable. Such
proposals come with costs and benefits, of course.213 One argument against
the adoption of a multi-year policy subsidy or mandate is that, in addition to
the examples of multi-year policies already in existence (discussed above),
to deal with the externality discussed here, but rather to force insurers to take into
account the fluctuations in catastrophic losses over time. Id.
210
Kleindorfer, Kunreuther & Ou-Yang, supra note 206, at 52.
211
Trevor Maynard & Nicola Ranger, What Role for “Long-Term Insurance”
in Adaptation? An Analysis of the Prospects for and Pricing of Multi-Year Insurance
Contracts, 37 GENEVA PAPERS 318 (2012).
212
Id. at 332. Reinsurance companies do offer multi-year policies, which may
internalize some of the single-year policy externality, insofar as reinsurers provide a
sort of coordinating function among primary insurers. See infra notes 219–30 and
accompanying text for discussion of Lloyd’s role in K&R insurance. See, e.g., MultiYear
Multi-Line
Insurance
Covers,
SWISS
RE:
CORP.
SOLS.,
https://corporatesolutions.swissre.com/innovative-risk-solutions/multi-year-multiline-covers.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
213
See infra IV.B.3 for discussion on such subsidy and mandate ideas.

296

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 28.1

perhaps the insurance market already provides something similar to multiyear policies on a much broader scale. That is, even without multi-year
contracts, the single-year-policy externality is ameliorated insofar as there
are costs to switching insurers. This is because when an organization decides
to switch property and casualty insurers, the new insurer will require the
insured to go through the underwriting process and may presume, in the
absence of good evidence to the contrary, that the switch is for adverse
selection reasons. This fact can lead to a mutual expectation that insureds
will tend to stay with the same insurer over time, at least for a few years,
which has some of the same cost-internalizing benefits of a multi-year policy
subsidy or mandate.214 For this reason, enacting some regulatory response to
the single-year-policy externality may not strictly be necessary.
B. RESPONDING TO THE RANSOM EXTERNALITY
1. Lessons from Kidnap-and-Ransom Insurance
The ransom externality—which is, of course, the key to the extortion
economy argument in favor of a ban—is a separate, and potentially more
serious concern that may require a substantial regulatory intervention. What
is needed is a way to internalize to cyber insurers and their insureds the cost
of the third-party moral hazard effects of their ransom payment decisions.215
One potential source of cost-internalization, which seems to be working in
the K&R insurance market, is coordination within the reinsurance
industry.216 K&R insurance presents a very similar third-party moral hazard
problem. Insurance companies provide coverage against the possibility of an
individual being kidnapped, and the coverage provides not only money to
pay the ransom, but the services of various professionals, including expert
advice about how to avoid getting kidnapped as well as the guidance of
professional ransom negotiators.217 If a kidnapping does occur, there is
obviously a strong incentive, felt by the insurer as well as the family of the
214

Also, to the extent a multi-year policy mandate would increase costs, perhaps
that cost increase could be spread further through the federal cyber insurance
backstop that we discuss below. See infra 249–54 and accompanying text.
215
To use Parchomovsky and Siegleman’s language. Parchomovsky &
Siegelman, supra note 27.
216
See generally SHORTLAND, supra note 11, at 67–78 (describing the ways in
which the reinsurance markets, especially through Lloyd’s, provides a form of
“private governance” to internalize the ransom externality).
217
Id.
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victim, to pay the ransom so as to avoid the death of the victim—a loss that
obviously cannot be fully compensated by any form of insurance. At the
same time, the direct insurer and the insured will tend to ignore—or
externalize—the effect of paying the ransom on future kidnappings—
because a substantial share of those kidnappings will not affect the direct
insurer or, obviously, the insured. This externality could put an upward
pressure on the number and amount of ransoms being paid, which could lead
to an upward pressure on the number of kidnappings and so on. This is what
Anja Shortland, in her recent book on the K&R insurance market, calls the
ransom externality.218
What is interesting for current purposes, however, is that Shortland
documents how the reinsurance market, without help from any government,
performs a cost-internalizing function of its own. Here is how it works.
Virtually all K&R insurance is reinsured through Lloyd’s member
underwriters, known as syndicates, which are pooled together, for purposes
of covering unexpectedly catastrophic losses, in the Lloyd’s Corporation.219
The Lloyd’s Corporation, then, has the power to set capital requirements and
underwriting standards for each of its syndicates.220 As a result, Lloyd’s is in
a position to prevent any given syndicate—any given individual insurer—
from getting into a habit of paying excessive amounts in ransom.221 As
Shortland puts it, “Lloyd’s therefore has all the mechanisms in place to
enforce a tacit agreement between competing insurers to operate in the longterm interest of the market.”222 What this means is that, when any given
insurer pays what Shortland calls a “premium ransom”—or an unreasonably
high ransom, taking into account all of the costs and benefits of ransom
payouts—Lloyd’s can step in and apply some discipline.223 The overall effect
is to ameliorate the third-party moral hazard effect on kidnap ransom
payouts.224
218

Id. at 171.
Id. at 63, 175.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 176. This discipline can be severe. “If a syndicate takes on excessive
risk or its business practices undermine the stability or smooth functioning of the
market, it can be closed for new business and wound up.” Id. at 175.
224
Again, while this moves things in the direction of overall efficiency, it is still
the case, of course, that insurers’ interests and societal interests do not perfectly
overlap. See supra note 194–95 and accompanying text.
219
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Could reinsurers serve such a similar coordinating, costinternalizing role in the ransomware insurance market? Possibly, although
not likely. For one thing, the cyber insurance market is much larger than the
K&R insurance market. While total annual K&R insurance premiums
written in 2019 were in the range of $250 to $300 million,225 the total
premiums written for the cyber insurance market in 2019 were closer to $4.5
billion.226 And roughly forty percent of that $4.5 billion in premiums flowed
to reinsurers.227 We have no data on how those premiums, and the
accompanying risk, are apportioned among the dozens of reinsurance
companies on the market. However, assuming it is spread across all of them
roughly in proportion to their overall market share, coordination among the
many cyber reinsurers would be considerably more difficult than it is within
the K&R insurance market that is dominated by a single entity, Lloyd’s of
London.228 This is not to say that the large cyber insurers and the large
reinsurers could not, in theory, get together and provide some underwriting
constraints on primary ransomware insurers. While there are over 100 directwriting insurance companies in the U.S. that provide some type of cyber
coverage, the bulk of the market share is provided by a handful of large
firms.229 Likewise, while there are dozens of reinsurers, the lion’s share of
that business is underwritten by a few very large companies.230 The question,

225

Patrick L. Brockett, Linda L. Golden, Stephan Zaparolli & Jack M. Lum,
Kidnap and Ransom Insurance: A Strategically Useful, Often Undiscussed,
Marketplace Tool for International Operations, 22 RISK MGMT. INS. REV. 421, 424
(2019).
226
John Coletti, Could Cyber Risk be a Growth Engine for Reinsurance?, SWISS
RE: REINSURANCE (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.swissre.com/reinsurance/propertyand-casualty/reinsurance/cyber-reinsurance/reinsurance-a-growth-engine-forcyber.html.
227
Id.
228
SHORTLAND, supra note 11, at 63 (“[C]ontrary to what an internet search for
kidnap insurance appears to indicate, there is only one place where [kidnap]
insurance is underwritten: Lloyd’s of London.”).
229
Geraldine Grones, Top 10 Cyber Insurance Companies in the US, INS. BUS.
MAG. (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/cyber/top10-cyber-insurance-companies-in-the-us-195463.aspx (“The top 10 insurers wrote
82.3% of the total US market.”).
230
See Jennifer Rudden, Largest Reinsurers Worldwide 2020, By Net Premiums
Written, STATISTA (Jan. 11, 2022), https://www.statista.com/statistics/273158/
largest-reinsurers-worldwide-by-net-premiums/.
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however, is whether they would have some means of enforcement
comparable to the tools available to Lloyd’s. We are dubious.231
In the absence of coordination among cyber insurers and reinsurers,
the other option is the U.S. government. That is, the federal government
could perform a regulatory role with respect to the ransomware insurance
market, seeking to discourage excessively high ransom payments from being
made and encourage best practices by insurers, ransom negotiators, forensics
firms, and other experts. Indeed, the framework already exists for this form
of federal regulatory involvement. According to a recent advisory from the
U.S. Department of Treasury, current U.S. law forbids ransom payments, or
any payments, by U.S. parties (individual or organization) to certain foreign
parties who are connected with countries subject to sanctions.232 This
prohibition is enforced by the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control (“OFAC”).233 OFAC maintains a list of “Specifically
231

This would not be the first time that large U.S. property and casualty insurers,
together with large reinsurance companies have gotten together to impose market
discipline on the smaller insurers. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764 (1993) (addressing whether various “conspiracies” among U.S. insurers
and foreign reinsurers to require certain changes to the standard commercial general
liability insurance policy violated the Sherman Act or was instead protected by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act). But we are aware of no such efforts by reinsurers to
coordinate underwriting practices on the part of cyber insurers.
232
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury’s Advisory, supra note 25, at 3. Specifically, the
Advisory provides as follows:
Under the authority of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA) or the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA),
U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in
transactions, directly or indirectly, with individuals or entities
(“persons”) on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List (SDN List), other blocked persons, and
those covered by comprehensive country or region embargoes
(e.g., Cuba, the Crimea region of Ukraine, Iran, North Korea, and
Syria).
Id. (citation omitted). Thus, by the terms of this advisory, any ransomware
payment—which is a type of transaction—with any party on OFAC’s SDN list
would be prohibited by law. The statutes cited as authority for this prohibition are
the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4301–41 and the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–06.
233
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury’s Advisory, supra note 25, at 3.
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Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons” (“SDN List”), which are parties
that all U.S. persons are forbidden to engage with, directly or indirectly.234
Making a payment to one of these parties can subject the payer, as well as
anyone who facilitates the payment (i.e., payer’s insurer), to substantial civil
or criminal penalties.235 While a ransomware victim who is attacked by
someone on OFAC’s SDN List can apply for special permission (or a
license) to enter into negotiations with that prohibited party, there is a
“presumption of denial” of such requests.236 OFAC further says that
“companies that engage with victims of ransomware attacks, such as those
involved in providing cyber insurance, digital forensics and incident
response,” should “implement a risk-based compliance program to mitigate
exposure to sanctions-related violations.”237
2. The Role of OFAC: Is Ransom Insurance Already
Banned?
Does this mean that ransomware payments and ransomware
insurance are already banned by U.S. sanctions law? Yes and no. On the one
hand, there is definitely a prohibition on making payments to those
ransomware attackers who appear on the SDN List, whether the payment
comes from the victim or someone working on behalf of the victim, such as
the victim’s ransomware insurers.238 On the other hand, the ban applies only
to payments to parties on the forbidden SDN List.239 Not all ransomware
attackers are on that list. How comprehensive the ban is depends on how
comprehensive that list is. Also, even insofar as the OFAC regulations
constitute an existing ban, it is only a limited or contingent ban. Specifically,
the OFAC appears to have some discretion in deciding whom to seek
234

Id. See also Specifically Designated Nationals and Blocked Person List
(SDN) Human Readable Lists, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/specially-designatednationals-and-blocked-persons-list-sdn-human-readable-lists (Apr. 11, 2022) (“As
part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC publishes a list of individuals and companies
owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries.”).
235
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury’s Advisory, supra note 25, at 3.
236
Id. at 5 (“[L]icense applications involving ransomware payments demanded
as a result of malicious cyber-enabled activities will be reviewed by OFAC on a
case-by-case basis with a presumption of denial.”).
237
Id. at 3.
238
Id.
239
Id.
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penalties against for such violations as well as in deciding whether there has
been a violation at all. Third, it appears that if ransomware victims, often
with the help of their insurers, cooperate with OFAC investigators—
immediately bring the attack to OFAC’s attention and follow their guidance
about how to proceed—the risk of any penalty is minimized.240 Indeed, there
is a longstanding OFAC compliance process that insurers have been
following for many years due to the application of the OFAC regulations to
the K&R market.241 Further, there is little evidence the OFAC is serious
about enforcing the ban ransomware payments to listed entities, as there has
not yet been a reported case of sanctions being imposed.
The practical effect of this regime, then, is a limited and contingent
(and to date largely unenforced) ban on ransomware payments (by victims
or insurers) to some subset of ransomware attackers, with OFAC playing the
role of shadow regulator. We are not suggesting that OFAC is doing with
ransomware insurance anything like what Lloyd’s does with K&R
insurance—providing a centralized sources of rules of conduct and a means
of disciplining insurers who fail to follow best practices. OFAC itself has
limited resources, many other responsibilities, 242 and—to date—no apparent
appetite for actually sanctioning parties who transact with listed ransomware
attackers. Coordinating the loss-control practices of dozens of cyber insurers
may just not be a high priority. But the potential is there. For example, in its
recently published guidance, OFAC noted that a key to avoiding penalties is
for organizations to “implement a risk-based compliance program to mitigate
exposure to sanctions-related violations,”243 and this recommendation was
expressly applied to cyber insurers, digital forensics companies, and others
240
Bethan Moorcraft, Marsh Sheds Light on OFAC’s Ransomware Advisory,
INS. BUS. MAG. (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/
cyber/marsh-sheds-light-on-ofacs-ransomware-advisory-239460.aspx.
241
Id.
242
“The Office of Foreign Assets Control (‘OFAC’) of the US Department of
the Treasury administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US
foreign policy and national security goals against targeted foreign countries and
regimes, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, those engaged in activities
related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to the
national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States.” Office of Foreign
Assets Control – Sanctions Program and Information, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/office-of-foreign-assets-control-sanctionsprograms-and-information (last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
243
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury’s Advisory, supra note 25, at 3.
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who participate in the “processing ransom payments.”244 Further, in its most
recent guidance, OFAC has made clear that a primary mitigating factor in
avoiding fines and other enforcement efforts is to engage in just the sort of
pre-breach and post-breach ransomware risk-minimization that we described
above—that insurers are in a good position to identify and encourage.
Specifically, OFAC says:
Meaningful steps taken to reduce the risk of extortion by a
sanctioned actor through adopting or improving
cybersecurity practices, such as those highlighted in the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA)
September 2020 Ransomware Guide, will be considered a
significant mitigating factor in any OFAC enforcement
response. Such steps could include maintaining offline
backups of data, developing incident response plans,
instituting cybersecurity training, regularly updating
antivirus and anti-malware software, and employing
authentication protocols, among others.245
Thus, OFAC is using the sanctioning power of the U.S. government to add
additional impetus for all parties involved (insureds and insurers) to
implement cybersecurity best practices.246
Further, the mere presence OFAC, and at least the possibility that it
will not grant an exception to permit payments to an attacker who appears
on the SDN list, creates a degree of uncertainty about insurance coverage for
ransomware payments, and that uncertainty can be a useful deterrent. That
is, the existence of a potential fine from OFAC, should an insurance payment
be deemed to be in violation of OFAC rules, increases the likelihood that any
given potential ransomware target may not ultimately have coverage. In
244

Id.
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury’s Off. of Foreign Assets Control, Updated
Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments 4–5
(Sept. 21, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ofac_ransomware_
advisory.pdf, at 4-5 (footnotes omitted).
246
The CISA’s Ransomware Guide referred to in the OFAC’s Updated
Advisory contains a list of pre-breach (“ransomware prevention”) and post-breach
(“ransomware response”) best practices. CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC.
AGENCY & MULTI-STATE INFO. SHARING & ANALYSIS CTR., RANSOMWARE GUIDE
(2020),
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA_MS-ISAC_
Ransomware%20Guide_S508C_.pdf.
245
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other words, even if there is an insurance policy covering ransomware
attacks, one would expect that coverage to be less likely to include insurance
for the ransom payment itself insofar as such a payment could potentially be
deemed a violation of OFAC regulations and thus a violation of public
policy.247 Of course, the uncertainty with respect to the OFAC fines also has
a downside, insofar as it undermines the risk-spreading value of the
insurance to the insured and thus discourages the purchase of coverage. The
key is to make sure that hackers have greater uncertainty with respect to
OFAC fines than the insureds and their insurers do. Indeed, perhaps this is
one function that OFAC compliance performs; allowing the insurer and
insured, to maintain some certainty that they will not be fined, while not
disclosing this information to the hackers.
It is possible, then, that the current regime—including the limited
ban on ransomware payments to parties on the SDN list and the emerging
oversight role played by OFAC—manages the ransom externality (and the
single-year-policy externality) reasonably well. Perhaps the inducement
from OFAC to adopt best practices in terms of cybersecurity will be enough
to motivate a change in behavior. If that is so, then no additional regulatory
intervention would be necessary. On this view, what would be needed is
time—time for the insurance market to develop its ability to price
ransomware coverage and to develop reliable standards of cyber hygiene that
insurers are willing to enforce (and continuously monitor), as some insurers
are already beginning to do.248 Therefore, if one is persuaded by the argument
so far, one might be tempted to say to the critics of ransomware insurance,
be patient. The insurance market and the U.S. government are figuring this
out, and the solution does not need to involve, for example, banning the sale
of ransomware coverage across the board.

247

When insurers are found to have issued an insurance policy that provides
coverage in violation of clear public policy, those insurers often are able to void
coverage. One example involves insurable interests. If an insurer sells a policy that
provide property coverage to someone who has no insurable interest in the covered
property, the coverage is voided. Jacob Loshin, Insurance Law’s Hapless Busybody:
A Case Against the Insurable Interest Requirement, 117 YALE L.J. 474, 479 (2007).
Even those hackers who are not presently on the SDN list must factor in the
possibility that they will be put on the list and then their targets, and any possible
insurer of their targets, will face the risk of an OFAC fine.
248
Recall the examples, cited by Cunningham and Talesh, of At-Bay and
Coalition. See supra note 202.
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In our view, however, there is a substantial likelihood that the
centralizing and cost-internalizing role played by OFAC will not be enough.
How likely is it, for example, that OFAC will decide to impose sanctions on
a party who makes a ransom payment because they had, prior to the attack,
failed to adopt recommended cybersecurity best practices?249 Because they
have not done so to date (or at least not such sanctions have not been publicly
reported), the likelihood seems small. As a result, the presence of OFAC and
the threat of sanctions will have little effect on parties’ pre-breach
cybersecurity practices. Further, even if OFAC can make a credible
commitment to include cybersecurity best practices in its determination of
who gets penalized, those penalties are limited to payments made to parties
on the SDN list, which is only a subset of the universe of hackers. For these
reasons, we still have concerns that the ransom externality could lead to
precisely the extortion economy that the ProPublica article predicted.250 In
the next section we offer an alternative, admittedly more radical proposal as
a way of sparking further discussion.
3. Another Proposal: Banning the Bad Insurance, but
Encouraging the Good Insurance251
Here is the proposal in brief. First, Congress would enact a ban on
any payments by a ransomware insurer to cover the costs of a ransom
payment, whether paid to the insured or paid directly to the attacker, and
whether the attacker appears on the SDN list or not. In other words, under
this proposal, Congress would impose a ban on insurance coverage of
ransomware payments only. Second, the ban would be accompanied by some
form of federal subsidy for cyber insurance coverage for the other costs of
ransomware attacks, including the costs of restoring the computer system as
well as business interruption and liability costs. The idea behind this twopronged approach is straightforward: both parts of the proposal—the ban and
249

See supra note 246.
Dudley, supra note 10.
251
We developed this proposal independently, but after our draft was posted on
SSRN the following paper, which makes a similar proposal, was brought to our
attention. See Jan Martin Lemnitzer, Why Cybersecurity Insurance Should be
Regulated and Compulsory, 6 J. CYBER POL’Y 118 (2021). Lemnitzer argues that
small to medium sized businesses should be compelled to buy cyber insurance. Id.
at 129. In his view, it is this segment where cyber insurance would do the most good.
Id. In part, Lemnitzer points to the lagging cybersecurity practices of smaller entities,
which has lead them to be more frequently targeted by cybercriminals. Id. at 125,
131.
250
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the mandate—would work together to undermine the profitability of
ransomware attacks. The ban would reduce the available resources to those
who decided to pay ransoms, and the subsidy/mandate would increase
available resources for those who refused to pay ransoms. Further, by
undermining the profitability of ransomware as a business model, this dual
approach would reduce the threat of such attacks, thereby resulting in lower
costs for the program—lower cyber insurance premiums (since the risk
would be lower) and, in turn, smaller federal subsidies necessary to fund the
program (since the premiums would be lower).
That is the basic idea. Now let us unpack it just a bit, beginning with
the ban. The ban would, again, be on insurance payments for ransom payouts
in the context of ransomware. It would be backed up with substantial fines,
which themselves would also be made uninsurable. We are imagining a ban
at the federal level, presumably implemented through a new act of Congress.
That is, we are not making the case that OFAC or the Treasury Department
generally has the authority to ban ransomware insurance coverage. So far as
we know, other than the ban on payments to parties on the SDN list
(discussed above), this would be the first federal ban of a particular type of
insurance coverage. It would not be the first ban of any sort on a type of
insurance coverage. Many states in the U.S., for example, expressly prohibit
liability insurance coverage for punitive damages.252 In addition, many states
disallow coverage for intentional wrongdoing.253
Although this proposal would ban insurance payouts to cover
ransom payments, accompanied by a threat of civil or criminal penalties
against insurance companies for noncompliance, it would not ban ransom
payments made by the victims of the attacks themselves. The main reason
for this limitation is simple: enforcing a comprehensive ban would be an
administrative nightmare. Given developments in technology, it has become
increasingly easy for criminals to launch a potentially devastating
ransomware attack on hundreds, even thousands, of potential victims
simultaneously.254 And while the examples of successful attacks that tend to
252

See Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents,
64 MD. L. REV. 409, 427–28 (2005).
253
Id. at 432.
254
See, e.g., James Rundle, Kim S. Nash & David Uberti, As Ransomware
Proliferates, Insuring for it Becomes Costly and Questioned, WALL ST. J. (May 12,
2021, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-ransomware-proliferatesinsuring-for-it-becomes-costly-and-questioned-11620811802 (“Groups such as
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generate headlines involve large ransom payouts from medium and largesized organizations, there are also many attacks on smaller players (small
businesses and individuals) who find their systems have been locked up.255
Many smaller attacks never even get reported to the police.256 How would
the government possibly enforce a ban against so many different target
individuals and organizations simultaneously?257 This does not seem doable.
In addition, the ban under this proposal would have an exception for
ransom payouts by insurers deemed necessary to protect the health or safety
of an individual or group of individuals. This exception is both a moral and
a practical necessity. If an attack on a U.S. hospital were to interrupt the
provision of medical services, patients could be harmed or killed.258
DarkSide, for example, believed to be behind the hack . . . on Colonial Pipeline Co.,
run a franchise business, licensing their ransomware to hacker entrepreneurs and
providing them with support and training . . . .”). Indeed, Chinese hackers were able
to exploit a flaw in Microsoft’s Exchange e-mail server to attack hundreds of
businesses. Kate Conger & Sheera Frenkel, Thousands of Microsoft Customers May
Have Been Victims of Hack Tired to China, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/06/technology/microsoft-hack-china.html.
255
See BARRACUDA NETWORKS, INC., SPEAR PHISHING: TOP THREATS AND
TRENDS 7 (2022), https://assets.barracuda.com/assets/docs/dms/Spear-phishingvol7.pdf (“[A]n average employee at a small business with less than 100 employees
will receive 350% more social engineering attacks than an employee of a larger
enterprise. SMBs are an attractive target for cybercriminals because collectively they
have a substantial economic value and often lack security resources or expertise.”);
VERIZON, 2019 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 5 fig.2 (2019),
https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/reports/2019/2019-data-breachinvestigations-report.pdf (“43% of breaches involved small business victims.”).
256
See Samara Lynn & Catherine Thorbecke, Why Ransomware Cyberattacks
are on the Rise, ABC NEWS (June 4, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/
Technology/ransomware-cyberattacks-rise/story?id=77832650; Danny Palmer,
Ransomware Victims Aren’t Reporting Attacks to Police. That’s Causing a Big
problem, ZDNET (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomwarevictims-arent-reporting-attacks-to-police-thats-causing-a-big-problem/.
257
Of course, there are far fewer ransomware insurers than there are potential
ransomware victims, which is why banning, or at least regulating, the ransomware
insurance market might be more practical than an outright ban on all payments.
258
See Kevin Poulsen & Melanie Evans, The Ruthless Hackers Behind
Ransomware Attacks on U.S. Hospitals: ‘They Do Not Care’, WALL ST. J. (June 10,
2021, 11:50 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-ruthless-cyber-gang-behindthe-hospital-ransomware-crisis-11623340215; Patrick Howell O'Neill, Ransomware
Did Not Kill a German Hospital Patient, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 12, 2020),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/11/12/1012015/ransomware-did-not-kill-
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Similarly, attacks on key infrastructure facilities, pipelines, and power grids
could pose risks to health and life. An infrastructure attack, for example, that
took out the electrical grid of an entire region of the country would disrupt
patient care in every hospital in the region—while most hospitals have
generator backups, they could also be affected by the attack if the fuel supply
is disrupted. In either case, if the administrators of a hacked hospital or power
facility were to decide to pay the ransom rather than take the risk of injury
or death that might result, and an insurance company were to facilitate that
payment, it seems unlikely that the government would, or should, follow
through with any serious punishment on anyone other than the hackers.259
One concern with having such a life/health exception is that it might
actually incentivize hackers to focus on hospitals and sensitive infrastructure
even more than they already do, on the theory that such targets are more
likely to have insurance coverage and thus be more likely to pay—or pay
more. We have three suggestions for how to respond to this perverse
incentive effect of the life/health exception.
First, this effect could be lessened by obscuring that life/health
exception from the outside world, especially from potential hackers. This
could be done using an approach similar to the current approach used by
OFAC. That is, the government would announce publicly that insurance for
all ransomware payments is banned, with no exceptions, except at the
discretion of the regulatory agency tasked with overseeing these transactions
(such as OFAC). That agency would then be responsible for deciding if
exceptions should be made in cases in which the threat to life or health
warrants doing so. The key is maintaining as much secrecy or obscurity as
possible about any exceptions that are granted. This would create uncertainty
with the potential hackers, and that uncertainty would serve as a tax of sorts
on every ransomware attacker with respect to every attack.
Second, we could make it harder for hackers to successfully attack
certain classes of sensitive targets, such as hospitals and infrastructure. For
example, we could make best-practice pre-breach cyber hygiene at hospitals,

a-german-hospital-patient/; William Ralston, The Untold Story of a Cyberattack, a
Hospital and a Dying Woman, WIRED (Nov. 11, 2020, 12:30 PM),
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ransomware-hospital-death-germany.
259
For a discussion of reasons why outright bans on payments of ransom (and
insurance for such payments) in the kidnap context are both immoral and
impractical, see Dutton & Bellish, supra note 32, at 328–29.
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utilities, and other such sensitive locations a matter of federal mandate.260
The idea would be to harden these targets relative to others (where the risks
of attacks can more realistically be fully insured), even though we are hoping
to discourage ransomware attacks on all targets. Others have proposed
creating federally mandated levels of cyber security. For example,
Cunningham and Talesh, in their recent detailed proposal to adopt a
comprehensive federal program for dealing with the risk of catastrophic
cyberattacks, suggest mandating that all purchasers of cyber insurance
products be required to maintain a baseline level of cyber hygiene, to be
determined jointly by the Secretary of Treasury, Cybersecurity Infrastructure
Security Agency of the Department of Homeland Security (CISA) and the
new National Cyber Director (NCD).261 We are generally sympathetic to this
suggestion, though it might make sense to focus such a mandate, at least
initially, on the most vulnerable potential targets.262
Finally, as a matter of U.S. criminal enforcement and diplomatic
policy, we could make clear that ransomware attacks on U.S. hospitals and
infrastructure will be prosecuted vigorously, if within U.S. criminal
jurisdiction, and, if outside U.S. criminal jurisdiction, will be made a top
diplomatic priority. Although the U.S. government cannot stop Russianbased hackers, Russia probably can. And as the U.S. tries to figure out what
line in the sand it is going to draw for Russia on ransomware, maybe the
following could be it. If you do not stop any cyberattacks on our hospitals
and infrastructure emanating from within your borders or from other
jurisdictions under your sphere of influence, we will take sanctions to the
next level.263
260
As the OFAC encourages compliance with the CISA recommendations, an
agency could mandate such compliance for hospitals and other key infrastructure.
See supra note 246.
261
H. Bryan Cunningham & Shauhin A. Talesh, Uncle Sam Re: Improving
Cyber Hygiene and Increasing Confidence in the Cyber Insurance Ecosystem via
Government Backstopping, 28 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, app. A (2021).
262
Focusing the most draconian safety mandates on the parties who are most
likely to be targeted for attacks is a common strategy in the terrorism context. Think
of the special security measures taken after 9/11 at all federal buildings, which were
perceived to be among the most likely future targets. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, FEMA 430, SITE AND URBAN DESIGN FOR SECURITY:
GUIDANCE
AGAINST
POTENTIAL
TERRORIST
ATTACKS
(2007),
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/fema430.pdf.
263
See, e.g., Dmitri Alperovitch & Matthew Rojansky, Ransomware Attacks
Won’t Stop Unless Biden Keeps the Pressure on Putin, WASH. POST (July 6, 2021,
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Just as the ban on ransom coverage would undermine the
profitability of the ransomware market, so too would a subsidy for
ransomware coverage for the costs other than the ransom payments—
specifically, for the costs of refusing to pay the ransom. Furthermore, if a
ban on insuring ransom payments were enacted, then a subsidy for cyber
coverage generally would almost certainly be necessary to avoid causing a
massive increase in what Kenneth Abraham and Daniel Schwarcz have
called the “cyber insurance gap.”264 This gap is the vast difference between
the amount of cyber insurance coverage currently being sold and the true
economic risk that such attacks potentially represent.265 The problem is that
eliminating the ability of insurers to pay a ransom demand would deprive
them of one important tool for minimizing their own insured costs of
providing ransomware coverage. That is, some ransomware attacks may
prove to be so costly that it is far cheaper for the insurer to pay the ransom
than to cover the other costs resulting from the attack. This is the flipside of
the collective action problem that arises if we permit insurers to cover
ransom payments. Sometimes the short-run, cost-minimizing strategy for a
particular insurer with respect to a particular attack, is to pay the ransom. But
deprived of that tool, insurers may become less willing to write cyber
policies in the first instance or perhaps they would only write the coverage
with even lower limits than they are now willing to provide. This would be
the greatest problem for attacks that might be considered part of a proxy
cyber war on the U.S. by foreign countries. Such attacks present the sort of
systematic or correlated risk that insurers have normally sought to avoid
covering through the use of blanket exclusions (i.e., the war exclusion).266
5:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/07/06/ransomwarecyberattack-biden-putin/ (arguing that, if Russia does not act on Biden’s requests to
stop ransomware attacks, the U.S. should “hit Russia where it hurts by sanctioning
its largest gas and oil companies, which are responsible for a significant portion of
the Russian government’s revenue.”); Nahal Toosi, Biden Wants Putin to Behave.
So Why Not Go After His Money?, POLITICO (July 27, 2021, 3:00 PM), https://www.
politico.com/news/2021/07/27/russian-critics-biden-putin-relationship-500818
(arguing for going after Putin’s secret wealth if he does not deliver on ransomware
attacks).
264
Abraham & Schwarcz, supra note 200, at 56.
265
Id.
266
See Adam B. Shniderman, Prove It! Judging the Hostile-or-Warlike-Action
Exclusion in Cyber Insurance Policies, 129 YALE L.J.F. 64 (2019) (discussing
exclusions for acts perpetrated by hostile nations). A CrowdStrike global survey
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What should the subsidy for non-ransom ransomware costs look
like? One possibility would be to replicate the approach used to stabilize the
terrorism insurance market after 9/11. The Terrorism Risk Insurance
Program (“TRIP”) was created in 2002 by the enactment of the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act (“TRIA”).267 The stated goal of the program was to
provide temporary stability to commercial property insurance markets in the
face of fears of a possible increase in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.268 What it
has become over time is a more-or-less permanent federal subsidy to the U.S.
terrorism insurance market.269
There are two essential components of the program. First, there is
the supply-side mandate—that is, insurers are required to offer terrorism risk
coverage in many of their property and casualty lines.270 The mandate says
revealed that sixty-three percent of cybersecurity experts viewed nation-states as one
of the cyber criminals most likely to cause concern, up from the previous two years.
CROWDSTRIKE, 2020 CROWDSTRIKE GLOBAL SECURITY ATTITUDE SURVEY 8
(2020),
https://iitd.com.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/global-security-attitudesurvey-report-2020.pdf. China is a particular concern as tensions between the U.S.
and China increase. Kevin Collier, U.S. Accuses China of Abetting Ransomware
Attack, NBC NEWS (July 20, 2021, 6:09 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/technews/us-accuses-china-abetting-ransomware-attack-rcna1448. There is evidence
that cyber insurers are becoming increasingly willing to invoke the war risk
exclusions, even in cases in which finding the original source of the attack is
difficult. See Cunningham & Talesh, supra note 261, at 19 (describing cyber
insurers’ more aggressive recent use of the war exclusion as a “gathering storm”).
267
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, 116 Stat. 2322
(2002). The program, which has been reauthorized four times (most recently in
2019), includes a mandate that all commercial property and casualty insurers offer
terrorism risk insurance coverage. FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
REPORT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE PROGRAM 5
(2020),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/311/2020-TRIP-EffectivenessReport.pdf (describing mandate). This mandate does not require insurers to offer the
coverage at a particular price, nor it does not require that insureds purchase the
coverage. Id. It only requires that coverage be made available. Id.
268
FED. INS. OFF., supra note 267, at 15 n.57.
269
TRIA, enacted originally in 2002, was renewed in 2005, 2007, 2015, and
2019. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS,
https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_terrorism_risk_insurance_act_tria.htm
(Oct. 18, 2021). The current reauthorization is set to expire in 2027. Id.
270
There are a number of lines of insurance that are expressly excluded from
the TRIP program, such as professional liability insurance. See 31 C.F.R. § 50.4(w)
(2019).
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nothing about the price that insurers should charge for this coverage
(presumably whatever price the market can bear), and there is no mandate
on the buyer’s side requiring the purchase of terrorism insurance.271 The
coverage merely has to be offered.
Second, in exchange for being required to offer this coverage,
insurers are able to participate in a federally funded terrorism-risk
reinsurance program, sometimes referred to as the federal “backstop.” 272
Because of this backstop, in the event a terrorist attack that is certified by the
Secretary of Treasury, causes a very large financial hit to the insurance
industry, the U.S. government will step in and bear some portion of the
cost—that is, roughly eighty percent of the cost above some triggering
threshold (around $200 million), with less a twenty percent individual
insurer deductible, up to a cap of $100 billion.273 Afterwards, the government
is required to recoup some portion of the reinsurance it provides, and is
empowered but not required to recoup the rest, through surcharges on the
insurance companies over time.274 The subsidy exists largely because of the
likelihood that, in the event of a very large loss, the government will not
invoke its discretionary recoupment power, and indeed, following a massive
attack on the U.S. in which the country is reeling from financial losses, may
not even carry through with the mandatory recoupment.
Could such a program—with a “soft” insurer-side mandate plus the
promise of a federal backstop—help to reduce the cyber insurance gap,
especially in a world in which there is a new ban on paying ransomware
demands?275 What has TRIP done for the terrorism insurance market? It is
generally considered to have been a success, in the sense that commercial
property and casualty coverage for terrorism risks have been stable and
insurers have been willing and able to offer the coverage at prices that are

271

FED. INS. OFF., supra note 267, at 3.
See, e.g., id. at 55.
273
BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45707, TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE:
OVERVIEW AND ISSUE ANALYSIS FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 4 (2019),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/terror/R45707.pdf.
274
Id. at i (“As insured losses rise above $37.5 billion, the Secretary is required
to recoup a progressively reduced amount of the outlays. At some high insured loss
level, which will depend on the exact distribution of losses, the Secretary would no
longer be required to recoup outlays.”).
275
Cunningham and Talesh propose such an idea as part of their “Catastrophic
Cyberattack Resilience Act.” Cunningham & Talesh, supra note 261, at app. A.
272
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not considered outrageous.276 However, there is also evidence that, while the
adoption of TRIP increased the take-up rates of terrorism coverage over time,
there are still a lot of businesses (in the neighborhood of thirty-seven percent)
that decline to purchase the (TRIP-subsidized) terrorism risk coverage that
is offered to them.277 What this means is that many commercial enterprises
remain uninsured or underinsured for terrorism-related risks.278
Less than stellar take-up rates for terrorism insurance is a problem
for the obvious reason that if a catastrophic series of attacks were to happen,
those businesses that did not purchase terrorism coverage may find
themselves in dire financial difficulty. But less than stellar take-up rates for
ransomware insurance—not coverage for ransom payouts, but coverage for
the other costs of such attacks—comes with an additional cost. It would
undermine the credibility of public commitments not to pay ransoms, thereby
undermining our attempt to disrupt the extortion economy. What can be done
about this? In addition to enacting a TRIP-like program of insurer-side
mandate and federal backstop, what about the introduction of a buyer-side
276

See, e.g., FED. INS. OFF., supra note 267, at 2, 82 (concluding that the
program mostly meets the goals set for it).
277
Id. at 28 (“Analyses by Treasury between 2005 and 2014 found that the takeup rate, when measured by the percentage of policies containing terrorism coverage,
increased from 27 percent in 2003 (the first full year of the Program) to
approximately 60 percent by 2006.”). Others have proposed either creating a new
federal cyber-attack reinsurance regime on the TRIP model or simply expanding
TRIP to cover non-terrorist cyber-attacks. See, e.g., Cunningham & Talesh, supra
note 261, at 51 (proposing the “Catastrophic Cyberattack Resilience Act,” which
would create a federal government backstop for the “cyber insurance ecosystem.”);
Abraham & Schwarcz, supra note 200, at 65 (suggesting the possibility of
“[e]xpanding federal reinsurance to apply to all cyber catastrophes, rather than just
those that meet the definition of terrorism . . . .”). But the reasons these scholars give
for providing a federal backstop are primarily based on the catastrophic nature of the
risk of cyber-attacks. For example, as Abraham and Schwarcz correctly point out,
the risk of cyber-attack, unlike almost all other insured property and casualty risk, is
not geographically bounded. Id. at 51. Even the worst hurricanes and earthquakes,
which can involve a large geographical area, are ultimately bounded by geography.
Similarly, as Cunningham and Talesh rightly emphasize, the possibility that insurers
will, in the event of a massive coordinated cyber-attack, invoke the war exclusions
in their policies, dramatically increases the likelihood that many claims would go
uncovered. Cunningham & Talesh, supra note 261, at 20.
278
Take-up rates also vary greatly by region and even by city. See FED. INS.
OFF., supra note 267, at 39 fig. 26 (noting Houston’s take-up rate in 2019 was fiftyfive percent, whereas Washington, D.C.’s was eighty-four percent).
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mandate as well? That is, we could enact a requirement that businesses and
nonprofits purchase cyber insurance coverage. Insurance mandates are not
unheard of. State governments have long required businesses to maintain
workers compensation insurance or car owners to maintain liability
insurance.279 More recently, the federal government has famously required
individuals to purchase health insurance.280 Also at the federal level,
although the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) does not directly
mandate that all homeowners purchase federal flood insurance, it does
require that anyone getting a federally backed mortgage in such a zone have
flood coverage.281 However, because many banks seem to be unwilling to
enforce the flood insurance mandate, only thirty percent of homes in the
highest-risk flood zones carry flood insurance, notwithstanding the
mandate.282 For that reason, in order to reduce the flood insurance gap, some
have proposed making that mandate more direct, along the lines of the

279

Every state requires employers of a certain size to provide workers
compensation coverage. See Workers’ Compensation Laws: State by State
Comparison, NAT’L FED’N OF INDEP. BUS. INC. (June 7, 2017),
https://www.nfib.com/content/legal-compliance/legal/workers-compensation-lawsstate-by-state-comparison-57181/. Similarly, every state has a financial
responsibility law requiring drivers to carry some minimal amount of liability
coverage. See Automobile Financial Responsibility Laws by State, Ins. Info. Inst.
(July 2018), https://www.iii.org/automobile-financial-responsibility-laws-by-state.
280
In 2010 Congress enacted the Affordable Care Act, which included the
famous “individual mandate,” requiring all qualifying individuals to purchase health
insurance. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091). The relevant provision states
that each “applicable individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure
that the individual . . . is covered under minimum essential coverage for such
month.” 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2011). As part of the 2017 tax bill, Congress
eliminated penalties for noncompliance with the Affordable Care Act’s individual
insurance mandate. Sarah Kliff, Republicans Killed the Obamacare Mandate. New
Data Shows It Didn’t Really Matter, Upshot, N.Y.TIMES (Sept. 21, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/upshot/obamacare-mandaterepublicans.html.
281
Howard Kunreuther, Improving the National Flood Insurance Program, 5
BEHAV. PUB. POL’Y 318 (2021).
282
Closing the Flood Insurance Gap, UNIV. OF PENN.: RISK MGMT. & DECISION
PROCESSES CTR., https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/policy-incubator/upgradingflood-insurance/closing-the-flood-insurance-gap/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
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Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate.283 Making cyber insurance
mandatory would similarly reduce the cyber insurance gap.284
Mandating the purchase of non-ransom ransomware costs would
provide a number of benefits. First, closing the cyber coverage gap would
discourage ransomware attacks. This is because, if the vast majority of
American businesses and nonprofits are covered by federally backed cyber
insurance for any harms the attackers cause, then hackers’ ability to extort
ransom payments would be undermined. Encouraging, even requiring, the
purchase of cyber coverage for the non-ransom costs of cyberattacks would
reduce the profitability of such attacks, by reducing the cost to insureds of
refusing to pay a ransom. Further, if this mandate/subsidies (along with the
ban) were to dramatically undermine the incentive to engage in ransomware
attacks in the first place, then the price of such coverage (and the cost to the
federal budget of the subsidies) would be likewise diminished. That is,
because mandatory insurance for non-ransom costs of ransomware attacks,
and mandatory non-insurance of the ransom, would send a credible signal
that the ransom payment would not be forthcoming, the price of the coverage
would be reduced.
In addition, if insurers have more at stake in the event of a continuing
onslaught of ransomware attacks, they will have much greater incentive to
do better at pre-breach, ex ante regulation of their insureds.285 And given
insurers’ superior access to direct data on what works and what does not in
terms of pre-breach risk reduction (data that would accrue over time as they
manage more claims), they would be in a good position—perhaps even a
better position than federal regulators—to identify and implement truly
optimal cyber hygiene practices among their insureds. Finally, closing the
cyber insurance gap would provide the risk-spreading benefits that insurance
is meant to provide—spreading the costs of ransomware attacks over the
broader insurance pool.
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See supra note 280 and accompanying text for discussion on the Affordable
Care Act.
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Of course, any proposal to require mandatory insurance coverage would have
many obstacles to overcome, including determining what the right amount of
coverage to require and the precise terms of the coverage. The few attempts that
have been made by governments to require cyber coverage thus far have not been
particularly successful. See Hai Jin Park, Incentivizing Cybersecurity Through
Cyber Insurance: Benefits and Pitfalls of Mandating Cyber Insurance (Mar. 24,
2022), at https://ssrn.com/abstract=4065565 (discussing efforts by governments of
California and South Korea to implement mandatory cyber coverage.).
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This again is consistent with the Abraham and Schwarcz observation. See
Abraham & Schwarcz, supra note 200, at 56–57, 65, 67.
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There are, of course, a number of serious objections that one could
raise in opposition to this idea. First, with respect to the insurer-side mandate
and backstop idea, why provide such a program for cyber risk, among all the
potential catastrophic risks that might benefit from such a regime? Why not
create a federal pandemic risk insurance program? Or, more generally, a
federal disaster risk insurance program? In fact, although these questions
take us well beyond the scope of this paper, such programs might well be
good ideas and for some of the same reasons suggested here: to close the
insurance gaps in those areas, putting the insurance industry on the hook for
a greater fraction of those losses, and thereby incentivizing them to find ways
to reduce these risks, as well as providing a means of risk spreading that has
advantages over counting on ex post government relief. But we need not
make those arguments here. A reason for beginning with cyber insurance is
the additional rationale of disrupting the ransomware extortion economy—
to interrupt the cycle of attacks that has made the ransomware market so
profitable for so many.
CONCLUSION
The problem of ransomware attacks is pervasive, growing, and
likely to continue to grow for the foreseeable future. Recent hacks
originating in China and Russia have made ransomware a significant
political issue. Given the potentially devastating costs of being held up by
ransomware hackers, that organizations have turned to insurance as a way of
managing this substantial and growing risk is unsurprising. But ransomware
insurance as a social practice has come under attack. Such insurance, the
argument goes, is fueling a cycle of criminal activity and providing
substantial funding for criminal enterprises; making the problem worse than
it would otherwise be. As a result, some critics have suggested banning such
insurance.
We have argued that the story of ransomware insurance is more
complex than previous reports have suggested. Insurers do much more than
indemnify insureds for losses, such as by paying the ransom or the cost of
restoring the network. They also offer significant pre-breach services
intended to reduce the risk of a successful attack or reduce the magnitude
when one ultimately happens. While recent research suggests the take-up on
those services from insureds is currently low, the market is still nascent, and
the rising premiums for cyber insurance may give insureds a reason to take
greater advantage of these services. In addition, insurers offer post-breach
services designed to assist insureds in responding to a cyberattack. Those
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services may help lower the overall costs of cyberattacks, by helping
insureds to negotiate lower ransom payments or even to decide to refuse to
make ransom payments in favor of rebuilding their networks, the costs of
which are also covered under these policies.
To be sure, there are inefficiencies arising from ransomware
insurance that need to be addressed. Both the single-year-policy externality
and the ransom externality can lead insurers and insureds to underinvest in
preventing successful ransomware attacks and to pay excessive ransoms
when such attacks are successful. Thus, the best case for ransomware
insurance entails intelligent regulation of the ransomware insurance market.
Others have offered suggestions for such regulation, including
recommending government subsidies for (and perhaps even a mandate of)
multi-year cyber policies that cover the costs of ransomware attacks, with
perhaps a limited ban on coverage for ransomware payments themselves.
Such regulation could in theory reduce the externalities associated with
ransomware coverage and help private ransomware insurance—together
with the U.S. government, perhaps through the involvement of the OFAC—
serve as a socially beneficial regulator of ransomware risk. Given this
possibility and the clear risk-distribution benefits of ransomware insurance
(especially in cases involving risk to life and limb), we conclude that it is, at
the very least, too early to declare that ransomware insurance is a net
negative for society. Thus, we propose a limited ban on insuring ransom
payments—with exceptions for situations involving potential serious
physical harm—with a government mandate that insurers provide cyber
insurance and ransomware coverage for the other associated losses (e.g., the
cost of restoration). That should be backstopped by a significant reinsurance
market. Given the reluctance of reinsurers to take on these risks, we discuss
the potential benefits of a program akin to TRIP, under which the
government would reinsure for catastrophic losses with a cost-sharing
mechanism between the primary insurers and the government reinsurance
program. If this program alone does not result in a drastic reduction in the
cyber insurance gap, we could also consider a buyer-side cyber insurance
mandate.

